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THE HYDROGEN BOMB TESTS IN PERSPECTIVE: LAWFUL
MEASURES FOR SECURITY
MYRES S. McDOUGALt and 11ORBERT A. SCHLEItt
"Unless a trustworthy and universal agreement upon disarnamenst,
conventional and nuclear alike, can be reached and an effective system
of ispection is established and is actually working, there is only onle
sane policy for the free world in the next fcw years. That is what we
call defense through deterrents. This we have already adopted and
proclaimed."
-SIR WINSTON CHURCHILL 1
THE LEGAL POLICY ISSUE
ON January 31, 1950, President Truman reluctantly ordered the Atomic
Energy Commission to proceed with development of the hydrogen bomb.
2
Political leaders of every shade of belief supported the decision, as did the
American public, most statesmen of the western world, the Vatican, and
others.8 The decision was taken, and was generally approved, because the
Soviet Union had refused to agree to a workable scheme of international
control of armaments, and had thus given the United States no choice but
to engage in an arms race of unprecedented magnitude and intensity. The
security of the United States and of the whole free world depended, it was
almost universally agreed, upon victory or at least parity in this race. Sub-
sequently it became known that the Soviet Union had begun its own thermo-
nuclear research in 1945, and was ahead of the west in the technological
struggle at the time of President Truman's decision.
4
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[Editor's note: Since this article constitutes in part a reply to the immediately pre-
ceding article, it is appropriate to note that it was not possible to make it available to
Dr. Margolis before publication.]
1. N.Y. Times, March 2, 1955, p. 8, col. 2.
2. N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1950, p. 1, col. 8.
3. For expressions of opinion on the issue, see, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1950, p. 30,
col. 3; id., Jan. 19, 1950, p. 12, col. 4 (Dr. Compton) ; id., Jan. 28, 1950, p. 6, cols. 2, 3
(Dr. Urey) ; id., Jan. 29, 1950, p. 1, col. 4, § 4, p. 8, Col. 2 (Sen. Connally and others);
id., Jan. 31, 1950, p. 1, col. 8 (Sen. Tydings and Mr. Lilienthal) ; id., Feb. 1, 1950, p, 4,
col. 2 (Mr. Baruch) ; id., Feb. 2, 1950, p. 7, cols. 3, 4 (Sen. Vandenberg) ; id., Feb. 3,
1950, p. 3, cols. 1, 2 (Osservatore Romano and Mr. McCloy). Congress unanimously
approved the funds requested for the program. Id., Sept. 1, 1950, p. 28, col. 2.
4. Statement by Commissioner Strauss reported in N.Y. Times, April 1, 1954, p. 20,
col. 1.
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The first thermonuclear bomb tests conducted by the United States, in
March and April of 1954 in the Pacific Proving Grounds, demonstrated the
enormous destructive power of the new weapon, and caused great concern
the world over. Through a series of miscalculations, a number of Marshallese,
Japanese, and Americans were injured by the test of March 1st, and the test
series as a whole in some measure disrupted the activities of a segment of
the Japanese fishing industry. As might have been foreseen, the Soviet Union
denounced the tests, characteristically couching its invective in the vocabu-
lary of law, and appealing to the abhorrence, shared by all peoples of the
world, of the destructive power of the weapon., The United States promptly
took all possible measures to repair the damage done, and expressed its ex-
treme regret that the mishaps had occurred.( After full compensation had
been paid or promised to the victims of the test accidents, 7 and the Trustee-
ship Council had accepted United States assurances that similar accidents
could and would be prevented in the future,8 the spurious legalisms of the
Soviet Union might appropriately have been dismissed with a minimum of
consideration. Unfortunately, however, certain neutral statesmen and im-
partial observers also have questioned the legality of these tests, appealing
both to certain customary prescriptions of the international law of the sea
and to certain provisions of the United Nations Charter and of the Trustee-
ship Agreement, under which the United States holds the Pacific Islands
In accord with the overwhelming demands of all peoples who value not
merely human dignity but even human survival, the United States is continu-
ing to make every practicable effort to achieve world disarmament and to
outlaw nuclear weapons.' 0 In the contemporary context of failure to achieve
5. See, e.g., U.N. TRUSTm.ESHIp COUNCIL OFF. REc., 14th Sess., 561st meeting 244-48
(1954) ; Standing Committee on Petitions, U.N. Trusteeship Council, Suninary Record
(Doc. No. T/C2/SR.198) (1954).
6. Standing Committee on Petitions, U.N. Trusteeship Council, 87th Report 4 (Doc.
No. T/L.510) (1954). See also N.Y. Herald Tribune, April 10, 1954, p. 2, col. 6.
7. A V,000,000 payment to Japao, "without reference to the question Uf legal lia-
bility" was agreed upon Jan. 4, 1955. N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1955, p. 6, col. 1. Settlement
of all Marshallese claims was reported in immediate prospect. Communication from Deputy
High Commissioner, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, to the Yale Li, Journal,
Feb. 24, 1955, on file in Yale Law Library.
S. U.N. TRUSTEESHIP CouNcIL OFF. REC., 14th Sess., F61st meeting 248 (1954),
adopting by 9 votes to 3 the joint draft resolution, U.N. Doc. No. T/L 504 (1954), sub-
mitted by Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom.
9. For assertions that the tests violate the law of the sea, and collection of citations,
see Margolis, The Hydrogen Bomb Experiments and International Laz, (A YALE L.J.
629, 629 n.3, 635, 640 (1955) (hereinafter cited as Margolis); Laurents, Expe'rinment in
Annihilation, 5 CON-EMP. IssuES 214 (1954); N.Y. Times, March 26, 1954, p. 5, col. 5
(Japanese Seamen's Union). See also the remarks of the Earl Jowett in 186 H.L Deb.
(5th Ser.) 808-09 (1954). For assertions that the tests contravene the Charter and Trustce-
ship Agreement, see Margolis, p. 645; remarks of the Soviet and Indian representatives
in the U.N. Trusteeship Council and its Committee on Petitions, cited supra note 5.
10. For an account of U.S. efforts from 1945 to 1950 to attain internatiunal c-ntrl
of atomic weapons, see JOINT COMMITME ON ATOmIc ENenGy, Tim Hvn,ra E.a Bow
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effective international control of armaments, the United States considers,
however, that it has no alternative but to keep itself armed for self-defense as
best it can.' Fortunately, almost all proponents of the free world-whatever
their idiosyncratic views about either strategy or tactics-still agree in this
determination, and recognize that to forego the testing and development of
the new weapons would amount only to unilateral disarmament, with atten-
dant invitation to destruction.'
2
The basic issue in legal policy thus joined, in this conflict between the
claim of the United States to conduct the hydrogen bomb tests and the de-
mands of others for their discontinuance, is, therefore, whether the United
States and its associates are authorized by relevant world prescription to
continue measures which they deem essential to their defense or whether
such measures must be condemned as unlawful, either through derivations
from the customary international law of the sea or by application of special
commitments undertaken in the United Nations Charter and the Trusteeship
Agreement.
TME FACTs
The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands is composed of 98 island groups
(2000 islands) with a total dry land area of 846 square miles, spread over
some 3,000,000 square miles of the North Pacific Ocean.13 The United States
governs the Territory as a strategic trusteeship territory under an agreement
with the United Nations which entered into force July 18, 1947.14
Testing of atomic weapons in the Pacific began with the test series con-
ducted at Bikini Atoll in July 1946,15 before the Pacific Islands became a
AND INTERNATIONAL CONTROL: TECHNICAL AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION, 81St Cong.,
2d Sess. 13-20 (1950). For analysis of recent developments see Cavers, The Arms Stale-
mate Ends, 11 BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS 9 (1955).
11. See State of the Union messages of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower. N.Y.
Times, Jan. 8, 1953, p. 10, col. 1; id., Jan. 7, 1955, p. 10, cols. 1, 2.
12. See, e.g., DAVIS, Two MINUTEs TILL MIDNIGHT c.2 (1955) ; FINLE'rml, POWER
AND POLICY 376-402 (1954) ; SLESSOR, STRATEGY FOR THE WEST 106-07 (1954); Morgen-
thau, The Political and M'filitary Strategy of the United States, 10 BULL. ATOM. SCIEN-
TISTs 323, 325 (1954) ; Woodward, "By Man Came Death," 11 id. 19 (1955) ; Marseille,
Negotiation from Strength, 11 id. 13 (1955) ; National Planning Association, American
Policy in the New Phase of the Cold War, 11. id. 97 (1955) ; Williams, The Great De-
bate: 1954, 80 U.S. NAVAL INST. PROCEEDINGS 247 (1954); Bryant, Co-existence-But
Not Surrender, N.Y. Times Mag., Feb. 6, 1955, p. 15; Spaak, The Atom Bomb and NATO,
33 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 353 (1955). See also Prime Minister Churchill's address on defense
and the hydrogen bomb, N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1955, p. 8, col. 1; British Government
Annual Statement on Defense, excerpted in id., Feb. 18, 1955, p. 1, col. 2; remarks of Labor
Party leader Clement Attlee reported in Time, March 14, 1955, p. 33, col. 3.
13. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on S.J. Res. 143,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1947); U.S. NAVY DEP'T, TRUST TERRITORY OF TIlE PACIFIC
ISLANDS 1, 77 (1948) (apparently giving total area of inhabited islands only).
14. 61 STAT. 3301, T.I.A.S. No. 1665, 8 U.N. TaEATv SER. 189 (hereinafter cited as
TRUSTEESHIP AGREEMENT).
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Trust Territory. On July 23, 1947, the AEC announced establishment of the
Pacific Proving Grounds, 16 and in December chose Eniwetok Atoll, near
Bikini in the Marshall Islands, as a site for subsequent testing activities. 17
The U.N. Security Council was advised by the United States that the atoll
and its territorial waters had been closed for security reasons, in accordance
with Article 13 of the Trusteeship Agreement, in order to enable the AEC
to conduct atomic tests.'
8
Because of the anticipated danger to ships approaching too near to Bikini
while tests were in progress in 1946, mariners were advised through normal
channels, during the months May through August, that the waters in an
area of approximately 180,000 square miles surrounding the atoll should be
avoided. 19 With the removal of testing operations to Eniwetok, mariners
were warned, in January 1947, and thereafter, that a zone of approximately
30,000 square miles would be dangerous to all ships, aircraft, and personnel,
and at times of actual danger the area was patrolled to ensure that no ships
or aircraft entered inadvertently.20 In May 1953, the warning area was ex-
panded to include Bikini and its surrounding waters, and from that date until
the most recent test series, the warning area included approximately 50,000
square miles.21 In March 1954, when it had become apparent that the warn-
ing area then in effect was inadequate, it was extended to include a total area
of approximately 400,000 square miles.2m On May 21, 1954, 57 days later,
16. N.Y. Times, July 24, 1947, p. 1, col. 2.
17. N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1947, p. 1, col. 6.
18. Letter from the Representative of the U.S. conccrning the conducting of experi-
ments relating to nuclear fission on Ejiwctok Atoll in the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands, U.N. Doc. No. S/613 (1947).
19. U.S. Navy Hydrographic Office, Notice to Mariners No. 19, para. 2915 (May
11, 1946), repeated in id. Nos. 20-31 of 1946, canceled, id. No. 32, para 4647 (August
10, 1946). A warning zone embracing some 2400 square miles of open sea southwest of
Eniwetok was in effect for more than a year. Id. No. 52, para. 66-7 (Dec. 29, 1945);
id. No. 1, para. 92 (Jan. 4, 1947).
20. U.S. Navy Hydrographic Office, Notice to Mariners, pt. 2, No. 3, para. 379 (Jan.
17, 1948), reprinted in id. Nos. 4, 6, 8, 9, 14, 52 of 1948, 40 of 1952. For description
of patrolling practices, see N.Y. Times, April 1, 1954, p. 20, col. 2. For pictorial presenta-
tion of the dimensions of this and subsequent warning zones, see U.S. Navy Hydro-
graphic Office, Track Chart of the World (No. 1262, 27th ed. 1943), excerpt reproduced
opposite p. 650 supra.
21. U.S. Navy Hydrographic Office, Notice to Mariners, pt. 2, No. 21, para. 2716
(Aay 23, 1953).
22. Id., No. 14, para. 1685 (April 3, 1954). The warning was issued by radio on
M4arch 26, 1954.
It should be emphasized that the actual blast effects of the bomb did not by any means
extend over this area, or even the smaller areas previously in effect. The fallout of radio-
active materials from a thermonuclear explosion, however, may contaminate an area up
to forty miles in width, extending downwind approximately 220 statute miles. See gen-
erally Statement by Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman, USAEC Press Rdeasl, Feb. 15, 1955,
pp. 1-3; N.Y. Times, April 1, 1954, p. 16, cos. 4, 6.
The March-Mlay warning area extended 450 nautical miles from Bikini in a sector
extending from east (095*) to west by southwest (2400). This larger warning area was
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all warning zones were canceled.23 Bikini and Eniwetok, and their territorial
waters, remained closed areas.
24
The magnitude of the test explosion of March 1, 1954, was underestimated
by half, and the error in advance calculations was compounded by erroneous
wind predictions. 20 This series of miscalculations resulted in minor injuries
to twenty-eight Americans and approximately eighty-two Marshallese on is-
lands outside the warning zone. 26 Injuries which eventually became serious
were suffered by the twenty-seven man crew of the Japanese fishing craft
Fukuryu Maru, which apparently lay some fourteen miles clear of the warn-
ing zone at the time of the explosion, and did not arrive in Japan until some
weeks later.
27
The extent to which fish contaminated by radioactive fallout were found
outside the immediate vicinity of the tests is not clear. 28 In any event, Japanese
authorities inaugurated a system of monitoring for radioactivity the catches of
ships reaching port from a wide area in the North Pacific, and condenned a
considerable quantity of fish.29 None of the rumors of injury from contami-
nated fish have been substantiated, and it seems certain that none ever occurred.
apparently established to avoid danger from movement of fallout materials with ocean
currents in the area, which flow west and northwest. For current data see U.S. DEr'r
OF INTERIOR, THE JAPANESE TUNA FIsHERIEs 8-9 (Fishery Leaflet No. 297, 1948). The
AEC has stated that radioactivity borne on ocean currents disperses to a point at which
it becomes "undetectable" within 500 miles or less. N.Y. Times. April 1, p. 20, col. 6.
23. U.S. Navy Hydrographic Office, Notice to Mariners, pt. 2, No. 23, para. 2932
(June 5, 1954) ; N.Y. Times, May 22, 1954, p. 6, col. 5.
24. U.S. Navy Hydrographic Office, Notice to Mariners, pt. 2, No. 23, para. 2932
(June 5, 1954).
25. Admiral Strauss' report in N.Y. Times, April 1, 1954, p. 20, col. 1.
26. Ibid.; Communication from Deputy High Commissioner, Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands, to the Yale Law Journal, Feb. 24, 1955, on file in Yale Law Library.
236 Marshallese, a figure often given as the number injured, were evacuated from Ronge-
lap and Utirik Atolls, but the 154 Utirikese were unharmed. The Rongelapese were
treated for depilation and superficial burns at Kwajalein, then resettled on Majuro Atoll
in June. All physical effects had disappeared by July, and no permanent after-effects
are expected. The Utirikese were returned to their homes in May, as soon as the AEC
could determine that the atoll was not radioactive. Ibid. For population statistics, see
Standing Committee on Petitions, U.N. Trusteeship Council, 871h Report 5 (Doe. T/L
510) (1954).
27. Arnold, Effects of the Recent Bomb Tests on Human Beings, 10 BULL. ATO.Nt.
SCIENTISTS 347 (1954). Some months later, one of the seamen died. Arnold expresses
the opinion that the survival of the others, after going so long without treatment after
so heavy and prolonged exposure to radiation, is "due to remarkable medical efforts."
Ibid. Arnold's account suggests that the eventual seriousness of the seamen's injuries
was attributable to the fact that they continued to be exposed to radiation for sonic two
weeks on the return trip to Japan, and were not all hospitalized until four weeks after
their initial exposure. Ibid.
28. For analysis of conflicting reports, see note 235 infra. We here assume, for purposes
of argument, that some radioactive fish were caught outside the warning zone, and that
safety would require monitoring deep-sea catches from a wide area in the North Pacific
Ocean for radioactivity after each test.
29. Arnold, supra note 27, at 347.
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The United States meanwhile took swift action to mitigate the effects of
the test mishaps. Injured Marshallese were given immediate medical care at
naval facilities on nearby Kwajalein Atoll; expert medical personnel were
rushed to their assistance, and to that of the injured Japanese fishermen as
soon as their plight became knowm; and prompt assurances were given that
all financial loss would be made good.30 Two million dollars has been paid
to Japan for damages resulting from the tests, including both personal injuries
suffered by the crew of the Fukuru Maru and damage to the Japanese fish-
ing industry.31 Settlement of all Marshallese claims is in immediate pros-
pect.
3 2
The United States has stated that if it finds it necessary to conduct further
tests, it will take all necessary precautions to avoid further injury.m Pre-
sumably among the measures taken would be the establishment of a warning
area comparable in size to that in effect during April and May 1954, and
temporary evacuation of the atolls nearest the test area. In this connection,
it should be noted that such a warning area would extend some hundreds of
miles beyond the point at which injuries were sustained by the crew of the
Fukuryu Maru,34 and that evacuation of every atoll affected by the tests of
1954 would temporarily displace 236 people from a total land area of 4.01
square miles. 35
30. Standing Committee on Petitions, U.N. Trusteeship Council, 871h Report S (Doc.
No. T/L. 510) (1954) ; Manchester Guardian, March 24, 1954, p. 2, col. 1; N.Y. Times,
March 25, 1954, p. 18, col. 7. See note 7 supra.
31. N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1955, p. 6, col. 1.
32. Communication from Deputy High Commissioner, Trust Territory, supra note 26.
33. See, e.g., Standing Committee on Petitions, U.N. Trustceship Council, Summary
Record 3 (Doc. No. T/C.2/SR.197) (1954); U.N. TRUSTErsHIP COUNCIL O'F. REC.,
14th Sess., 561st meeting 245 (1954).
34. See notes 22-27 supra and accompanying text.
35. For land and population data, see U.S. DWo'T OF INTRIoR, 1952 REror ON TiE
ADmINIsTRATION OF THE TRUsT TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLA'DS 68 (1953).
Evacuation of an area 260 statute miles in radius surrounding Eniwetok Atoll would
affect only Ujelang Atoll, with a population of 163 and a land area of .67 square miles.
Ibid. The possibility that Ujelang, some 130 miles away from Eniwetok, would be
affected by the fallout of a thermonuclear explosion (40 miles in width, see Statement
by Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman, USAEC Press Release, Feb. 15, 1955, p. 2), would
amount to less than one chance in twenty, even assuming total failure of wind predictions. The
inhabitants could, therefore, very probably be returned to their homes with perfect safety
immediately after completion of a test series.
Since its inception in 1946, at Bikini, the nuclear testing program has necessitated the
relocation, temporary or relatively permanent, of a total of 540 Marshallese, from islands
with a total area of nine square miles. See note 26 supra; U.S. NAvY DEPT, TnuST
TEaRToay OF THE PACIFIC IsLANDs 77 (1948). The land area of Bikini is 2.87 square
miles, 69 WORLD ALM ANAC 519 (1954), and that of Eniwetok 2.26 square miles. N.Y.
Times, Dec. 2, 1947, p. 24, col. 5. All land taken has been replaced from the public
domain, and full compensation has been paid for all financial loss. U.S. DE;P'T or I.-
TmoR, 1952 REPORT, op. cit. supra, at 35; Standing Committee on Petitions, supra note
33, at 6-7.
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THE ATTACK UPON LEGALITY
Those who attack the legality of the Pacific tests ordinarily begin by im-
plying that any use of atomic and thermonuclear weapons would be unlawful
and that this conclusion has some relevance to the legality of the tests.A'
Their principal attack is, however, cast in terms of so-called "traditional and
universally accepted rules" said to be found in the international law of the
sea,37 and an attempted "inescapable" interpretation of the U.N. Charter and
the Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands. 8
The most comprehensive and detailed elaboration of this attack appears in the
immediately preceding article by Dr. Emanuel Margolis.8 9
"Freedom of navigation," "freedom of fisheries," "freedom to lay submarine
cables," and "freedom of aerial movement," Dr. Margolis argues, are "corol-
laries" of the "absolute rule" of "freedom of the seas."40 Although there are
some "general police powers" which may be exercised on the high seas "in
time of peace," and some "special police powers" which may be acquired by
treaty, the bomb tests and the warning areas they make necessary fall within
neither class.41 They are, therefore, forbidden by the "clear rule of law" that
"no state can exercise sovereignty over the high seas in time of peace.' "
It is further argued that the tests' injurious effects upon fishing, outside the
zone of immediate danger, violate some ill-defined international prescription
against pollution, or at least do not measure up to "justice and equity," and
that the tests must therefore be stopped.
43
Finally, it is asserted as an "inescapable" conclusion that testing of nuclear
weapons by the United States in the Pacific Proving Grounds is "at vari-
ance" with the "unqualified imperatives" of Article 73 of the U.N. Charter
and Article 6 of the Trusteeship Agreement.4 4 By selective reading from that
article of the Charter, it is noted that member states there recognize the
principle that the interests of the inhabitants of non-self-governing territories
"are paramount," and accept as a "sacred trust" the obligation to promote
the "well-being" of the inhabitants and to this end to ensure their protection
against "abuses." 45 By similar exegesis upon the Trusteeship Agreement,
it is added that the Administering Authority undertook to promote the eco-
nomic development of the inhabitants by "the development of fisheries," to
protect the inhabitants against "the loss of their lands and resources," and
36. Margolis, pp. 629 n.2, 639 n.59.
37. Id. at 636.
38. Id. at 643-45.
39. Margolis, The Hydrogen Bomb Experiments and Intcialional Law, 64 YAU"
L.J. 629 (1955).
40. Id. at 630, 634.
41. Id. at 634-36.
42. Id. at 635.
43. Id. at 641-43.
44. Id. at 643-45.
45. Ibid.
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"to protect the health of the inhabitants. '40 It is argued, further, that these
provisions are not, at least not within the same section, "diluted" by the
phrase: "subject to the requirements of security." 47 It is then stated as a
fact that injury to persons and property in connection with tests is "bound
to occur," and that the tests therefore violate the Agreement. 0 But even
if danger of injury could be eliminated the tests would still be illegal, it
is said, because the necessary safety measures would violate the agreement
in that they would involve "removing [the inhabitants] from their land,"
and "depriving them of fishing grounds for months at a time."4 9 It makes
no difference to this conclusion that the Agreement gives the administering
authority "full powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction" over
the territory, and the power to "establish naval, military and air bases and to
erect fortifications" in the territory, as well as other broad powers with re-
spect to security.5 0 By some curious criterion of construction, none of the
powers of the administering authority are relevant in ascertaining the ex-tent
of its duties: the latter are "unqualified imperatives."5 1
The United States' only alternatives, these critics conclude, are to cease
further testing altogether, or to conduct tests in a manner which is "compatible
with the basic general tenets of international law, and the specific provisions of
the United Nations Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement."5 2 This can be
done "only . . .by conducting them . ..within the . ..United States, or
Alaska, or somewhere within the Arctic Region in the 'sector' north of
Alaska "
53
It is our belief that all of these arguments are unsound in law and in
policy, and we propose to refute them seriatim.
THE REGIME OF THE HIGH SEAS-A PROCESS OF COMMUNITY
PROTECTION OF UNILATERAL CLAIMS
The Process of Asserting and Adjusting Claims
Throughout the centuries of its development, one may observe the regime
of the high seas 5 4 as, not a static body of absolute rules, but rather a living,
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48 Id. at 645 and n.86.
49. Id. at 645.
50. TRUSTEESHIP AGREEmENT arts. 3, 5, 13.
51. Margolis, p. 644. For a comparable line of argument, see the St'iet and Indian
representatives' remarks in U.N. TRUSTEESHip COTNcIL OFF. REn, 14th Sess., 561st
meeting 243-47 (1954). Mr. Singh of India emphasized that the conducting of hydrogen
bomb tests was not specifically listed in the Agreement as one of the things that the
Administering Authority could do in the territory. Id. at 246.
52. Margolis, p. 646.
53. Id. at 646-47. See also Arnold, Effects of the Recent Bomb Tests on tluanwo Beings,
10 Bum- AToll. Sc=mTss 347, 348 (1954). Margolis, p. 647 n.94, asserts that an Arctic
sector has been "claimed7' and "occupied" by the United States.
54. The term "high seas" is commonly used both in a factual sense tu describe all
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growing, customary law, grounded in the claims, practices, and sanctioning
expectations of nation-states, and changing as the demands and expectations
of decision-makers are changed by the exigencies of new social and economic
interests, by the imperatives of an ever developing technology and by other
continually evolving conditions in the world arena. From the perspective of
realistic description, the public order of the high seas is not a mere body of
rules, but a whole decision-making process, including both a structure of
authorized decision-makers and a body of highly flexible, inherited prescrip-
tions: it is a continuous process of interaction in which the decision-makers
of individual nation-states unilaterally put forward claims of the most diverse
and conflicting character to the use of the world's seas, and in which other
decision-makers, external to the demanding nation-state and including both
national and international officials, weigh and appraise these competing claims
in terms of the interests of the world community and of the rival claimants,
and ultimately accept or reject them.
The competing claims asserted by nation-state decision-makers to the use
of the high seas, the events to which the "regime of the high seas" is a re-
sponse, vary enormously in the comprehensiveness and particularity of the
interests sought to be secured, in the location and size of area affected, and
in the duration of the claim. They range from the comprehensive and con-
tinuous claim to all competence in the "territorial sea," through the con-
tinuous but limited claims to navigation, fishing, and cable-laying upon the
"high seas," to the relatively temporary and limited claims to exercise au-
thority and control beyond territorial boundaries for a vast array of national
purposes: security and self-defense, enforcement of health, neutrality, and
customs regulations, conservation or monopolization of fisheries, exploita-
tion of the sedentary fisheries and mineral resources of the seabed and con-
tinental shelf, the conducting of naval maneuvers, military exercises, and other
peacetime defensive activities, and so on.m
It need cause no confusion that the authoritative decision-makers put for-
ward by the public order of the high seas to resolve all these competing
claims include, in addition to judges of international courts and other inter-
national officials, those same nation-state officials who on other occasions are
themselves claimants-that, in other words, the same nation-state officials are
sea areas, whether "territorial sea," "contiguous zones," or whatever, and as a legalistic
label to describe a part of the seas subject to a regime distinct from those governing
other areas of the sea. For lack of an accepted terminology distinguishing these two
very different references, we continue in the pages that follow to use the term in both
senses, relying upon the context to make clear which meaning we intend in particular
instances. Our reference here and in the title to this section is of course the factual one
to all sea areas.
55. This categorization of the claims which nation-state decision-makers assert
against each other is not intended to be sharp and precise but rather to identify broad
groupings. At their peripheries the categories obviously merge and overlap. The third
category, in particular, contains some claims which may be asserted over long periods
of time and include a very considerable degree of authority and control.
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alternately, in a process of reciprocal interaction, both claimants and external
decision-makers passing upon the claims of others. This duality in function
("d~doublement fonctionnel") merely reflects the present lack of specialization
and centralization of policy functions in international law generally."u Similar-
ly, it may be observed, without cause for deprecation or shocked averting of
the eyes, that these authoritative decision-makers projected by nation-states
for creating and applying a common public order, honor each other's uni-
lateral claims to the use of the high seas not merely by explicit agreements
but also by mutual tolerances--expressed in countless decisions in foreign
offices, national courts, and national legislatures-which create expectations
that power will be restrained and exercised in certain uniformities of pat-
tern.5 7 This, too, is but the process by which in the present state of world
organization most decisions about jurisdiction in public and private inter-
national law are, and must be, taken5s
The over-riding policy which infuses this whole decision-making process,
perhaps it requires explicit statement, is not the negation of use, but the
encouragement of use. The major policy purpose which inspires the regime
of the high seas is not merely the negation of restrictions upon navigation
and fishing but also the promotion of the most advantageous-that is, the
most conserving and fully utilizing-peaceful use and development by all
peoples of a great common resource, covering two-thirds of the world's sur-
face, for all contemporary values.' 9 The concept of a common and reciprocal
interest in fullest utilization underlies the whole flow of decision.
56. ScHIER, THE LEGAL COsMiMU'iuT" OF MNKIxD 204 0l954), exp,.unding the
views of Georges Scelle.
57. When Dr. Margolis insists that "special police powers are created oaly by treaty',"
Margolis, p. 634, he over-emphasizes the role of agreement. The great bulk of par-
ticular claims to authority and control upon the high seas is honored and protected, as
the text below will abundantly demonstrate, not by explicit bilateral or multilateral agree-
ments but by reciprocal tolerances expressed in the continuous flow of decisions about
such claims.
.58. This process of unilateral claim and reciprocal tolerance with respect to authori-
ty over particular value changes, indispensable to the stability in expectations and p,,wvr
calculations of nation-state decision-makers, operates easily through the cmplementarity
and ambiguity of prescriptions cast in terms of "territoriality," "nationality," "pa±,siv e
personality," "universality," "jurisdiction," "choice-of-law," "act of state," ' immunity,"
and so on. See McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy, 82 I-LAGt:E .\cAD-Am
DE Daorr INTENxATIONAL, RECUEIL DES COURS (hereinafter cited as HAGtvc REeC-EL) 137,
213 (1953) ; Niboyet, Tcrritoriality and Universal Recognition of Rules of Conflict of
Laws, 65 HA.v. L. REv. 582 (1952); Yntema, Thw Historic Bases of Prikate Intena-
tional Law, 2 Am. J. Comp. L. 297 (1953); Comment, "Act of State" Inmunity, 57
YAL.E L.J. 108 (1947) ; Comment, The Jurisdictional Imunity of Foreign Sm'crcins,
63 YALE L.J. 1148 (1954).
59. Appropriate emphasis upon a positive policy uf prumtting, rather than restrict-
ing, use may be found in Lauterpacht, Sovereignty over Submarine Areas, 27 BnirT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 376, 378, 407 et seq. (1950) ; and in the U.N. Secretariat, Reyime of the llih
Seas, U.N. Doec. No. A/CN.4/32, at 10, 12 (1950) (memorandum to the Int'l Law
Comm'n) (hereinafter cited as Gidel, Memorandum). (It is widely known that this im-
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For pursuing this major policy purpose in regulating the maze of conflict-
ing claims which confront them, the authoritative decision-makers of the
world community have elaborated that comprehensive body of complementary
prescriptions which makes up "the regime of the high seas." One set of these
prescriptions, that generally referred to under the label of "freedom of the
seas," was formulated, and is invoked, to honor unilateral claims to navi-
gation, fishing, cable-laying, and other similar uses.60 The other set, that
which includes the prescriptions summed up in a wide variety of technical
terms such as "territorial sea," "contiguous zones," "jurisdiction," "conti-
nental shelf," was formulated, and is invoked, to honor all the great variety
of claims, both comprehensive and particular, which may interfere, in greater
or less degree, with navigation and fishing."' To the initiated it is not sur-
prising that the technical terms in which both sets of these prescriptions are
formulated are at the highest level of abstraction and, hence, ambiguous in
highest degree. A decision-maker confronted with the task of deciding upon
the lawfulness of a challenged claim to the use of the seas must create mean-
ing for these terms and must turn to other sources for detailed policy guid-
ance. The sources to which such a decision-maker, like the judges of the
International Court of Justice, is authorized, and may be required by the
necessities of policy clarification, to turn include not only "international con-
ventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recog-
nized by the contesting states," but also "international custom, as evidence
of a general practice accepted as law," "the general principles of law recog-
nized by civilized nations," "judicial decisions and the teachings of the most
highly qualified publicists of the various nations," and considerations "e.r
aequo et bono.
'" 62
The great ambiguity of the constituent technical terms in the principal pre-
scriptions and the wide variety of authoritative policy sources accorded to the
portant study is the work of Gidel, although the author is not identified in the publication
itself. See BuiG~s, THE LAW OF NATIONS 383 (2d ed. 1952) ; 1 GUGGENuEiM, TRAITL
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 391 n.3 (1953) ; Lauterpacht, szpra, at 408 n.1.)
60. See text at notes 68-84 infra.
61. See the sections on "Territorial Sea," "Contiguous Zones," and "Security" claims,
text at notes 85-103, 104-43, 144-91 infra, respectively.
62. STAT. INT'L CT. JUsT. art. 38.
It is our purpose in this explicit and comprehensive listing of authorized sources of
policy to emphasize that the authoritative decision-makers of the public order of the high
seas are not confined in their determinations of lawfulness either to explicit agreements be-
tween the parties or to inferences from prior customary behavior, but may also take into
account a great variety of principles, precedents, analogies, and considerations of fairness.
The role established for such a decision-maker is not that of the automaton but rather of the
creative deliberator, who is permitted and expected to draw upon the wisdom of the past,
but is not required to respond compulsively to new problems in living contexts as if they
were old problems in dead contexts.
Gidel refers to the "wider significance" of "the unilateral act" and describes it as "one
of the means by which international custom is formed." Gidel, Memorandum 90. It is not,
however, necessary in accurate description of the regime of the high seas to take the position
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authorized decision-makers have given, and continue to give, to such decision-
makers, a very large discretion to adjust particular controversies in terms of
the multiple variables peculiar to each controversy and thus to promote the
overriding policy of full-utilization. The degree to which decisions for the
last century and a half, because of common interest in the sea as an efficient
medium of communication and as an abundant source of food, have given a
high priority to claims for freedom of navigation and fishing, is sufficiently
emphasized in conventional literature. It is equally common knowledge,
however, though on occasion reluctantly admitted, that a parallel flow of
decisions has protected a great variety of claims to authority and control on
the high seas for the protection of security, health, revenue laws, economic
welfare, and so on, even against protests that they interfere with navigation
and fishing, and that a still higher priority is accorded to claims of "sover-
eign" competence in "territorial seas" despite such interference.04 It has been
recognized in decision, if not in the justifications summarized in the text-
books, that all of these claims, those to navigation and fishing and those that
may interfere, are of a common character: they are all unilateral assertions by
particular claimants to individual use of a great common resource and all such
assertions are affected in equal degree-navigation and fishing no more or no
less than the others-with community interest in fullest utilization and con-
servation, and with national interest, which, though possibly varying with
geographical propinquity in particular instances, is in the sum of all instances
common to all claimants. 65 The technical prescriptions of the "freedom of the
seas," on the one hand, and of "territorial sea," "contiguous zone," "juris-
that unilateral claims to the use of the seas of themselves establish their own lawfulness.
It is not the unilateral claims to use but rather the tolerances of external decision-makers,
including the specific decisions of international officials, which create the expectations of
pattern and uniformity in decision, of practice in accord with rule, commonly called law.
An excellent recent example of the interrelation of roles, which we here seek to describe,
between unilateral claim and external decision is found in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries
Case, Judgment of Dec. 18, 1951, [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 116. In this case Norway asserted
claims which could not be justified by reference to either explicit agreement or widely
accepted custom, see generally Valdock, Thc Anglo-ANoregion, Fishers Case, 28 BraT.
Y.B. IN'L L. 114 (1951), but by drawing upon all relevant sources of policy and a great
variety of considerations in the context, the International Court of Justice concluded, despite
the protests of other nation-states, that Norway's claims were lawful. This decision by the
International Court of Justice merely exemplifies the process of dedsion-maLing-the
process by which policies are both created and applied-common to the whole regime of the
high seas, whether decision is by international or national officials and whether the claims
are important or unimportant, and whether unique or commonplace.
63. See text at notes 63-84 infra.
64. See text at notes 85-103, 104-43, 144-91 infra.
65. Our purpose here is to emphasize that it is impossible in accurate description to
distinguish some claims as "unilateral" and some as not, and difficult, if not impossible, in
rational preference to order claims in some hierarchy of degrees of community interest
valid for all problems and contexts. The relevance to policy of prupinquity of use to shure
will be assayed below. See note 204 infra. For discussion of traditiunal distinctions, see
Mouro., THE CoN-TriNETAL SHELaF 135 (1952).
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diction," and so on, on the other, are not arbitrary, inelastic dogmas, but
rather are highly flexible policy preferences invoked by decision-makers to
record or justify whatever compromise or adjustment of competing claims
they may reach in any particular controversy. And for all types of contro-
versies the one test that is invariably applied by decision-makers is that simple
and ubiquitous, but indispensable, standard of what, considering all relevant
policies and all variables in context, is reasonable as between the parties.00
The all-pervading importance of this test of "reasonableness" for resolving
competing claims to authority and control on the high seas has been well in-
dicated by Professor H. A. Smith, who, though as spokesman for official
British policy is most opposed to extension of national power beyond terri-
torial seas, writes:
"The law of nations which is neither enacted nor interpreted by any
visible authority universally recognized, professes to be the application of
reason to international conduct. From this it follows that any claim [to
assert power outside the 3-mile limit] which is admittedly reasonable
may fairly be presumed to be in accordance with law, and the burden of
proving that it is contrary to law should lie on the state which opposes
the claim."
067
Without accepting Professor Smith's explanation for the use of reasonable-
ness as a criterion, one may yet applaud the accuracy of his summary of
decision-makers' perspectives.
The sections of this article which immediately follow are intended to sug-
gest the broad outlines of relevant world prescriptions regulating the use of
the high seas and to indicate in greater detail the process of decision. It will
be observed that the emphasis of decision-makers upon "reasonableness" as a
criterion has required them to accord a very high deference to claims to
security, as against claims to unhampered navigation and fishing, in contexts
of high expectations of violence. It will be made clear that the hydrogen bomb
tests contravene none of the fundamental policies which underlie the "freedom
of the seas" and come easily within the policies which have in the past sanc-
66. This generalization will be documented in detail throughout the five sections which
follow. For exposition of the principle see Gidel, Memorandum, passin; Lauterpacht,
Sovereignty over Submarine Areas, 27 BRIT. Y.B. INr'L L. 376 (1950). See also IIAvAm)
RESEARCH DRAFT ON TERRITORIAL WATERS 333 et seq. (1929) ; JEssur, LAW oF Tuimti-
TORIAL WATERS 91-101 and passim (1927) ; MASTERSON, JURISDICTION IN MARGINAL. SEAs
xiii-xviii, 375 et seq. (1929) ; Bingham, Juridical Status of the Continental Shelf, 26 CAL1r.
L. REV. 4 (1952) ; Briggs, Les Etats-Unis et la Loi de 1935 Sur la Contrebande-F.Iide de
la Zone Contigt& et des Critres de Raisonnabilit, 20 REVUE DI Dnorr INTERNATIONAL Lr
DE LGISLATION COMPARE (herinafter cited as R.D.I.L.C.) 3d Ser. 217 (1939); Brown,
Protectize Jurisdiction, 34 Aia. J. INT'L L. 112 (1940); Dickinson, Jurisdiction at the
Maritime Frontier, 40 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1926) ; Jessup, The Anti-Smuggling Aet (if 1935,
31 At. J. INT'L L. 101 (1937) ; Masterson, The Hemisphere Zone of Security and the
Law, 26 id. 860 (1940); Yntema, Validity of Hovering Legislation in International
Law, in Hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means on H.R. 5496, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 82 (1935).
67. SMITH, THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA 20 (1950).
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tioned the greatest variety of claims more seriously interfering with navi-
gation and fishing. It will, therefore, be concluded that the relevant vorld
prescriptions and the process of decision-making, taken as a whole, dearly
enable, and perhaps even require, decision-makers external to the United
States, whether national or international, to recognize and affirm that the
hydrogen bomb tests are reasonable, and hence lawful, within the regime of
the high seas.
THE GREAT RANGE OF UNILATERAL CLAIms HONORED IN
CoMMuNITY PRACTICE
Claims to Navigation and Fishing: Freedom of the Seas
The concept of "freedom of the seas" entered the law of nations as a re-
action against broad claims to territorial sovereignty over vast sea areas put
forward by Spain, Portugal, England, and other states in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries. The object of these claims was to monopolize fisheries,
and trade with areas thought particularly rich in resources. Grotius and his
successors entered the fray in behalf of their own states' unilateral claims to
navigate, to trade, and to utilize the resources of the seaYs
The arguments Grotius asserted were as sweeping as the claims of his ad-
versaries. No interference whatever with navigation was justified because
effective occupation was impossible by the nature of the sea itself.c3 The same
principle was applicable to fisheries, not only because natural law denied
property rights in the resources of the sea until they were reduced to posses-
sion, but for the additional reason that the resources of the sea were in-
exhaustible.70 Spain, Portugal, and England were guilty of monstrous greed,
he said, because they could not possibly put to constructive use the vast areas
they had claimed, but sought only to exclude others." The claim of the Dutch
to free navigation and fishing, on the other hand, could not possibly interfere
with free use of the same resources by others.72 It is familiar history that
common interest in navigation and fishing triumphed over monopoly, and that
the great principle of "freedom of the seas" became in this sense universally
accepted.
68. GpoTius, FR Dom oF TaE SEAS vi (Magoffin trans. 1916). For accounts of the
series of controversies in which Grotius and his successors participated, see FumTvO, TnE
SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SA c. 9 (1911); 1 GIDE., DR0oT INTERNATIONAL PLIELIC DE LA% MRm
127-48 (1932) ; 1 0PPEXHEB, INTERNATIONAL LAw §§248-51 (7th ed., Lauterpacht 1948)
(hereinafter cited as OPPENE-Ei-LAUTERPAC11T); Porr , TuE Fnrom OF THE SEAs
c. 4 (1924).
69. For exposition and analysis of the reasoning, involing a distinction between
ownership and sovereignty, by which Grotius reached his conclusions, see FumL.o, op. d.
supra note 68, at 345 et seq.; RIESENFELD, PRoTEcrioN OF COASTAL FIsuMiMs UNz I.:-
TmExATioxAL LAW 15-18 (1942).
70. FULTOx, op. cit. supra note 68, at 345; RiESENFELD, op. di. mSpra note 69, at 12, 16.
71. GRoTIus, op. cit. supra note 68, at 38.
72. Ibid.
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The natural law arguments put forward by Grotius have long since ceased
to be persuasive, and nearly every fact from which he argued has significant-
ly altered. It has long been clear that vast areas of the sea could in fact be
occupied, in the sense that others could be effectively excluded by shore bat-
teries, and by naval and air forces armed with modern weapons. Moreover,
it is no longer true to say that complete freedom of navigation and fishing
cannot possibly interfere with free use of the seas by others. Modern vessels,
independent of wind and weather conditions, throng trade routes which fol-
low the shortest and safest track between ports, and collisions are not infre-
quent.73 Vessels similarly interfere with the navigation of others by trawling,
dredging, or engaging in dangerous naval maneuvers and military exercises,
and they discharge oil waste that fouls beaches and destroys marine life. 14
Contemporary technology has demonstrated that the resources of the sea are
by no means inexhaustible, and more than once the free use of dangerously
efficient new methods has threatened to destroy valuable fishery resources
forever.75 Manifold national interests of critical importance no longer cease
at the shore or near it, and have come to affect not only pirates, invading
military forces and smugglers, but innocent passersby as well.
Yet despite the remarkable changes which have occurred since Grotius' time,
the concept of "freedom of the seas" has not disappeared from world pre-
scription because it still crystallizes one of the two complementary sets of
sound community policies, each limiting the other, by which decision-makers
resolve conflicting claims to incompatible uses of a common resource. To be
sure, ships at sea are regulated by the rules of the road ;70 ships that require
space can get it by making appropriate signals, 77 and governments disseminate
warnings which enable merchant vessels to avoid naval ships engaging in danger-
ous maneuvers. 78 Fishery conservation is increasingly enforced on the high
seas by individual states,79 as are regulations designed to prevent pollution,80
and to implement the policies of individual states in innumerable other ways.
But it remains true that the world community as a whole has an important,
73. HILBERT, INTERNATIONAL RULES OF THE ROAD AT SEA Vii-Viii (1938).
74. See text at notes 172-84 infra; Final Act of the 1954 International Conference on
Pollution of the Sea by Oil, Annex, Resolution 1 (mimeo unchecked copy 1954) (on file
in Yale Law Library) ; MOUTON, THE CONTINENTAL SHELF 186 (1952).
75. Gidel, Memorandum 38-39.
76. HILBERT, op. cit. supra note 73, passim; SMITH, Op. Cit. supra note 67, at 61-62.
The courts of most nations assume jurisdiction over collisions occurring on the high seag
irrespective of the nationality of the vessels. The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355, 369 (1885) ;
The Scotland, 105 U.S. 24, 29 (1881) ; Chartered Bank v. Netherlands Steam Navigation
Co., 10 Q.B.D. 521 (1883) ; Lauterpacht, supra note 66, at 407.
77. HILBERT, op. cit. supra note 73, passhn; 1 INTERNATIONAL CODE OF SIGNALS passimn
(1931).
78. See text at notes 173-84 infra.
79. See text at notes 120-24 infra.
80. See Franqois, Report on the Regime of the Territorial Sea 12 (U.N. Doe. No.
A/CN.4/53) (1952) (Report to Int'l Law Comm'n).
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continuing interest in encouraging the greatest practicable freedom of navi-
gation and fishing, and the unilateral claims of states to make such uses of
the sea for their own benefit continue to be preferred over other unilateral
claims which serve community interest in less degree.
"Freedom of the sea" is, thus, no absolute, and never has been.8 1 It is, as
it was in the beginning, a legal conclusion invoked to justify a policy prefer-
ence for certain unilateral assertions as against othersPs The claims it favors
are those to the utmost freedom for navigation, fishing, and other pursuits
thought to further the most productive use of the sea and its resources, and
thus to promote the community interest.83 It combats monopolistic claims,
and minimizes international friction by confining each state's regulatory
power, where possible, to ships flying its own flag, thus avoiding wrangles
over seizure of ships and crews and other incidents of enforcement.84
Continuous and Comprehensive Claims: The Territorial Sea
The most familiar group of demands which conflict with claims to navi-
gation and fishing are certain continuous claims to exercise a "bundle of com-
petences" termed "sovereignty" over a littoral belt of waters called the "terri-
torial sea."8 5 Although the right of states to claim a territorial sea has not
been seriously questioned since the early nineteenth century,80 the conflict be-
tween competing claims in this area is still so sharp that the most basic
elements of possible compromise are still unsettled. Not only is the width of
the area which may be claimed still disputed, but also the baseline from which
this unknown width must be measured, and the very degree and scope of the
81. For excellent recent statement, see Lauterpacht, So'reignty over Submarine
Areas, 27 BirT. Y.B. IT'L L. 376, passim, but especially 399, 403-10 (1950); Gidel,
Memorandum 74, 112.
82. "Freedom of the seas" has, of course, been most strongly supprted by large mari-
time states and less enthusiastically by nations with predominantly coastal interests. See
Porr=, THE FazEnom OF THE SMxs c. 11 (1924); Boggs, Xational Claims in Adjacent
Seas, 41 GEoGRkPHicAL Ray. 185, 203-04 (1951). The national interests which have under-
lain most historic assertions of "freedom of the seas" are sufficiently obvious. For citatiuns
see note 68 supra; cf. Gidel, M1enwrandnt 3.
83. See Lauterpacht, supra note 81, at 407. Navigation and fishing are not "corollaries"
of the principle of freedom of the seas, as Dr. Margolis suggests, Mfargolis, p. (030, but
the primary reference of the words. It is commonplace, liowevi.r, that "freedm uf the
seas" may be invoked to justify uses of the seas other than navigation and fishing, and that
any and all uses may limit the freedom of other users. See .Mot'To:, TH CONTrINEaTAL
SHELF 185-87 (1952).
84. Lauterpacht, spra note S1, at 403-04,408.
85. The quoted terms are from 3 GiDEL, DROIT INTEurATI NAL PCnLIc r'L L% Mnt 14
(1934). For citation to the few authorities who continue to debate whether the powers exer-
cised in territorial sea by littoral states amount to "sovereignty" or something less, sve
Franqois, Report on the Regime of the Territorial Sea 7-8 (U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/53)
(1952) (Report to Int'l Law Comm'n).
S6. Kent, The Historical Origins of the Three-M1ile Limit, 48 Am. J. INTI'L L 537
(1954).
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authority that may be exercised within the area once its limits are ascer-
tained.
From the beginning of the modern law of the sea, it has been recognized
that the reasonable needs and interests of littoral states required that they be
permitted to extend their boundaries some distance seaward, and that pro-
tection of this claim was more in accord with community interest than were
the inconsistent claims of states to unimpeded use of the seas for all. Grotius
cautioned that his principle of freedom of the seas applied only to the "sea,
properly speaking," not to bays and straits or to seas adjacent to the shore.8 7
As the interests of states crowded outward, first exclusive fishing rights, then
neutrality, and later all the interests which a sovereign state may act to
protect were recognized to justify national claims to adjacent seas.88 Bynker-
shoek's cannon-shot rule and Scandinavian claims to an all-purpose zone of
measured-width were at one with community interest: they fused to form
the body of prescriptions summed up in the term "territorial sea." 89
Although more than 300 years have passed since Grotius published his
famous brief, it is still not possible to say much more than that the regime
of the high seas applies only to the "sea, properly speaking," not to "terri-
torial seas." Although several large and influential states, among them the
United States, have consistently maintained that the maximum seaward ex-
tent of the territorial sea should be three miles, a much larger number of
states and virtually all publicists agree that the "three-mile rule" is valid only
as a minimum. 0 Some thirteen states accept the three-mile rule for one or
more purposes, while some forty-five states repudiate it in greater or less
degree.9' The 1930 Conference for the Codification of International Law
brought to light the extent of the disagreement between states on the per-
missible width of territorial waters,9 2 and in the intervening years, as the
discussions in the International Law Commission bear witness, the gap ap-
87. GROTIus, FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 37 (Magoffin trans. 1916). The quoted words are
from Wright's translation, quoted in RIESENFELD, PROTECTION OF COASTAL FISI'IuS
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 (1942).
88. Pontanus, a fellow-countryman of Grotius who carried on the Grotius-Selden con-
troversy over fishing rights, conceded in 1637 that adjacent seas could be subjected to
ownership and exclusive jurisdiction. Id. at 19-20. For later historical development, see
Kent, supra note 86, passim; Walker, Territorial Waters: The Cannon Shot Rule, 22 Barr.
Y.B. INT'L L. 210 (1945). Nation-states are now, of course, conceded to enjoy "sovereign"
rights over territorial seas. See BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS 281-84 (2d ed. 1952);
HARVARD RESEARCH DRAFT ON TERRITORIAL WATERS 243 et seq. (1929) ; International Law
Commission, Report, U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY OFF. REC., 9th Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 13-14
(Doc. No. A/2693) (1954).
89. Kent, supra note 86, at 552-53; Walker, supra note 88, at 228-31.
90. For collection of state practice and citations, see Franqois, supra note 85, at 11-21.
91. Id.atl8, 11-15.
92. Gidel has called the three-mile rule "la grande vaincue de ]a Conference," and
added, "I1 est d~sormais impossible de parler de la rgle des trois milles comme constituant
une r~gle de droit international commun positif." 3 GIDEL, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
DE LA MER 151 (1934).
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pears to have widened. 93 Even in the countries which adhere to the three-
mile rule there is widespread dissatisfaction with its operation. Bingham
spoke the preference of many when he said, "The irresistible tide of
economic, political and social interests is running against the Anglo-American
three-mile doctrine. It is doomed."0' 4
A striking recent illustration of the flexibility of the international pre-
scriptions relating to the territorial sea is the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries
Case,95 in which the United Kingdom attacked Norway's system of measur-
ing its four-mile territorial sea from straight baselines instead of the low
water mark following roughly the sinuosities of the coast. The International
Court upheld Norway's system upon broad grounds of reasonableness, al-
though that system was almost unique in the practice of states and extended
Norway's exclusive fishing rights over a considerable area beyond that
afforded by the traditional method of delimitation. Norway's straight base-
lines were valid, said the court, because they were adapted to its "practical
needs and... requirements." The court emphasized the unusual geographic
configuration of the coast, and "economic interests peculiar to [the] region,
the reality and importance of which are clearly evidenced by a long usage."90
Noting the "general toleration of foreign States" over an extended period,
the court held that the Norwegian system could not be considered an
unreasonable infringement of the rights of others.97 Judge Alvarez, concurr-
ing, was most explicit:
"Each State may . ..determine the extent of its territorial sea and
the way in which it is to be reckoned, provided it does so in a reasouable
manner, that it is capable of exercising supervision over the zone in
question and of carrying out the duties imposed by international law,
that it does not infringe rights acquired by other States, that it does no
harm to general interests and does not constitute an abts de droil."Os
Within territorial seas, nation-states may monopolize fisheries, may apply
their general legislation almost as fully and freely as they do within their
93. See, e.g., International Law Commission, Prozisional Summary Records (U.N.
Does. Nos. A/CN.4/SR.164-72) (1952).
94. Bingham, Changing Concepts of International Law: Maritime Jurisdiclin in Tine
of Peace, 34 PROc. Am. Scc'Y INT'L L. 54, 62 (1940). See alo HALL, IJUZ.rIO':.L
LAW 157 (7th ed. 1917) ; 1 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL Law 455 (1945); 1 \VESTLAK, I-TFR-
NATI0NAL LAW 188-89 (1910) ; Borchard, Resources of the Continntal Shelf, 40 Am. J.
INT'L L. 53, 61 (1946) ; Brown, The Law of Territorial Waters, 21 id. 101 (1927) : Brown,
The Marginal Sea, 17 id. 89 (1923).
One need not, however, agree with these statements of preference, since mvst if nut all
legitimate ends may be adequately secured by less comprehensive claims of the tN pv de-
scribed in text at notes 104-43 infra. For full discussion, see OD.s, Ricuss uF THE SF..
AND ITERNA-TIONAL LAW (unpublished thesis in Yale Law Library 1953).
95. Judgment of Dec. 18, 1951, [1951] I.C.j. Rep. 116.
96. Id. at 133,138.
97. Id. at 138,142.
98. Id. at 150,153.
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land boundaries, 99 and to a certain extent may exclude vessels altogether. 100
Other states' claims to "freedom of the seas"-that is, to use and enjoy tile
seas for their own benefit,-become tenuous and vestigial in territorial waters,
but are yet too strong to be ignored. The policy preferences summed up in
"freedom of the seas" are represented in the law of territorial waters by the
doctrine of "innocent passage."'' Thus in the recent Corfit Channel Case,10 2
the International Court, emphasizing that the Channel connected two parts of
the high seas and formed part of a heavily traveled maritime route, held that
Albania could not deny passage through the strait even to warships, although
it might regulate passage.
10 3
It is, in summary, obvious that only the flexibility of the relevant pre-
scriptions at the disposal of decision-makers, permitting them to adjust par-
ticular decisions to changing needs and conditions, prevents serious friction
between nation-states with respect to the riot of conflicting claims within and
at the outer boundaries of territorial seas. Within such boundaries, the needs
of littoral states for comprehensive governmental powers and the no less
important needs of all for open lines of communication and commerce are
adjusted by application of "innocent passage" and of appropriate qualifica-
tions to that doctrine created as occasion may require. Beyond territorial
boundaries and with respect to the multiple important claims to specific and
limited competences now extended many miles out to sea, such safety-valve
concepts as "contiguous zones," "jurisdiction," "continental shelf," and so on,
to which we now turn, prevent the continuing controversy over the seaward
extent of the territorial sea from doing serious harm to community and na-
tional interest.
Particular Claims for Limited Purposes: Contiguous Zones
Before the territorial sea had become a familiar concept in international
law, it was already in some respects obsolete. The modest distances at which
99. For collection of citations on the powers of states within territorial seas, see
BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS 281-84 (2d ed. 1952); HARVARD RESEARcHi DRAFT ON
TERRITORIAL WATERS 243 et seq. (1929). See also International Law Commission, Report,
U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY OFF. REC., 9th Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 13-14 ct seq. (Doe. No.
A/2693) (1954).
100. Id. at 18, art. 20 (2). For U.S. practice, see the Act of June 25, 1942, 56 STAT.
390, 50 U.S.C. § 781 (1952), providing criminal penalties for violation of regulations relat-
ing to Defensive Sea Areas. For typical regulations, see Exec. Order No. 8680, 6 FED. REG.
1014 (1941), corrected by Exec. Order No. 8729, 6 FED. REG. 1791 (1941), excluding all
persons not authorized by the Secretary of the Navy from the territorial waters of Kiska
and Unalaska Islands. For collection of all laws and regulations to date relating to Defen-
sive Sea Areas, see U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DOCUMENTS 1948-49,
pp. 157-69 (1950).
101. JESSUP, LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS 120 (1927).
102. Judgment of April 9, 1949, [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4; Note, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 220
(1950).
103. Corfu Channel Case, Judgment of April 9, 1949, [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4, 28-29.
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the limits of the territorial sea had tended to crystallize were already inade-
quate to protect certain pressing interests of littoral states. The attempt to
protect these interests took, and even today sometimes takes the form of an
attempt to extend territorial waters, but the pressure of community policy,
reinforced by the national interests of large and influential states in seas
adjacent to foreign coasts, made extension of territorial waters an unaccept-
able solution. Accordingly, states claimed rights of "jurisdiction" or "control"
-less than "sovereignty"-for special purposes, and limited their claims to
the minimum distance, the minimum degree of comprehensiveness, and the
minimum length of time necessary to effectuate particular purposes. Claims
of this nature which were reasonable evoked no significant protest.10t Some
authorities spoke of "territorial sea for customs," "territorial sea for neutrali-
ty," and the like;105 others differentiated the claim to sovereignty within
territorial waters, and claims to lesser rights beyond, grouping the latter
under the heading "contiguous zones."1 0 One of the earlier statements of the
fundamental policies which underlie such claims was made by Chief Justice
MNarshall, in the famous case of Church v. Hubbart,10T which recognized the
validity of Portugal's claim to exercise authority on the high seas to protect
commercial interests in its colony of Brazil. Asserting that the power of a
state to secure itself from injury "may certainly be exercised beyond the
limits of its territory," the Chief Justice continued:
104. See Lauterpacht, Sovereignty over Submarine Areas, 27 BmiT. Y.B. IN't. L 376,
406 (1950).
As the following pages will show, the assertion by Margolis, p. 635, that "sovereignty"
may not be exercised over high seas areas, is totally irrelevant to the issue to which he
addresses himself. If anything is clear, it is that the United States has never claimed
"sovereignty" over any "high seas" areas and has no need to make such a claim in order
to justify the control it seeks for the hydrogen bomb tests. See text at notes 192-93 infIra.
It is altogether impossible to comprehend the contemporary law of the sea without dis-
tinguishing between the comprehensive and continuous rights of "sovereignty" claimed only
within "territorial seas" and the lesser rights claimed under other labels beyond. Hyde in
his Foreword to JEssup, LAw oF TEmrroRrl WNATEs Lx (1927), speaks of "the important
distinction observed by maritime states between claims assertive of territorial control over
particular waters, and claims of purely jurisdictional aspect asserted through acts com-
mitted on the high seas." Jessup himself has said: "There is a %ital distinction between
that maritime belt which is claimed as a part of the territory of the state and the limited
rights of control or jurisdiction claimed upon the high seas." Id. at xxxiii. See also .Lts-
mEsoN, JTJisDicrioN rN MIARGINAL SEAs xiii-xviii, 375 ct seq. (1929) ; Briggs, Les Etats-
Unis et la Loi de 1935 sur la Contrebande-Etude do l[a Zone ContiguZ et des Critres de
"Raisonnabilita", 20 R.D.LL.C., 3d Ser. 217, 231-32 (1939); Gidel, La Mer Tcrritoriale
et la Zone Contigul, 48 HAGUE REctEm 137 (1934).
105. Martial, State Control of the Air Space over the Territorial Sea and the Con-
tiguouts Zone, 30 CAN. B. Rxv. 245,254 (1952).
106. The term "contiguous zone" did not come into general use until the Codification
Conference of 1930. See Gidel, supra note 104, at 138 ct seq. The concept itself is, of course,
very much older, as will be seen infra.
107. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187 (1804).
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"Any attempt to violate the laws made to protect this right [to monopo-
lize colonial trade], is an injury to itself, which it may prevent, andit
has a right to use the means necessary for its prevention. These means
do not appear to be limited within any certain marked boundaries, which
remain the same, at all times and in all situations. If they are such as
unnecessarily to vex and harass foreign lawful commerce, foreign nations
will resist their exercise. If they are such as are reasonable and neces-
sary to secure their laws from violation, they will be submitted to.
"In different seas, and on different coasts, a wider or more contracted
range, in which to exercise the vigilance of the government, will be as-
sented to. Thus, in the channel, where a very great part of the com-
merce to and from all the north of Europe, passes through a very narrow
sea, the seizure of vessels . . . must necessarily be restricted to very
narrow limits; but on the coast of South America, seldom frequented by
vessels .... the vigilance of the government may be extended somewhat
farther; ... foreign nations submit to such regulations as are reasonable
in themselves .... ,10
It is this concept of a reasonable competence beyond territorial seas which
most clearly reveals that enduring flexibility which permits the regime of the
high seas to meet the changing needs of contemporary life.
The first national interest clearly to escape the confines of the territorial
sea was, typically, that of the fisc. Beginning at least 250 years ago, states
began to exercise rights of jurisdiction and control upon the high seas in order
to enforce their customs laws, in zones ranging from six to three hundred
miles from shore.10 9 Britain, a staunch supporter of the three-mile rule, as
recently as 1876 claimed a customs zone of three hundred marine miles, and
today exercises limited jurisdiction twelve marine miles from shore.110 Since
1790, the United States has maintained a contiguous zone for customs con-
trol of twelve nautical miles,"' and since 1935 has provided by law that when-
ever the President finds that an area on the high seas outside customs waters
is frequented by hovering vessels, he may create "customs enforcement areas"
extending sixty-two miles from shore for a distance of two hundred miles
along the coast." 2 At least twenty-six states claim a contiguous zone, outside
108. Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187, 234 (1804). On the interpretation
and significance of this case, see Dickinson, Jurisdiction) at the Maritime Frontier, 40 HAIRV.
L. Rav. 1, 4 et seq. (1926). See also Hudson v. Guestier, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 293 (1808) ;
The Vinces, 20 F.2d 164, 172 (E.D.S.C. 1927) ; Croft v. Dunphy, (19331 A.C. 156; Naim
Molvan v. Attorney-General for Palestine, [1948] A.C. 351, 369.
109. See MASTERSON, op. cit. supra note 104, at 1-120, 175-247.
110. Id. at 1-161; Masterson, The Hemisphere Zone of Security and the Law, 26
A.B.A.J. 860,861 (1940).
111. 1 STAT. 156 (1790).
112. Anti-Smuggling Act of 1935, 49 STAT. 517, 19 U.S.C. § 1701 (1952). For exercise
by the President of his authority to create customs enforcement areas, see Proclamations
Nos. 2131, 49 STAT. 3462 (1935) ; 2132, id. at 3464; 2149, id. at 3484; 2150, id. at 3485;
2152, id. at 3488. Cases of seizure of ships under this Act are discussed in Briggs, supra
note 104, at 248-55.
For careful demonstration of the compatibility of this Act with international law, and
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territorial waters, for customs enforcement purposes.113 A recent report to
the International Law Commission does no more than recognize the obvious
when it states that "it would be impossible to dispute the right of states to
institute a contiguous zone for Customs purposes."'"
Another interest achieving early protection was that of security of neutral
states against belligerent activities. As the range of weapons of war increased,
coastal states were forced to claim extended rights of jurisdiction and control
over the high seas in order to protect their shores from injury by foreign
vessels in combat. In the famous incident of the Alczana and the Kearsarge
during the American Civil War, the French authorities prevented an engage-
ment between the two ships just outside French territorial waters, and es-
corted the Alabaina some distance out to sea where a battle eventually took
place.115 Other states extended neutral zones from time to time as occasion
demanded, until, by the Declaration of Panama of 1939, the governments of
twenty-one American republics asserted an "inherent right" to have the waters
"to a reasonable distance from their coasts" remain "free from the commission
of hostile acts and from the undertaking of belligerent activities" by nations
engaged in war.11 6 This "security zone" encircled the United States and
Central and South America, embracing the waters of the Atlantic and Pacific
for distances ranging from 300 miles off the tip of South America to some
1200 miles off the coast of Florida.117 Although on several occasions the
zone was violated, and in response to protests the belligerents challenged its
documentation of the standard of reasonableness, see Yntema, l'alidity of Hoveringi Legis-
lation in International Law, in Hearings before the House Comnittee on ii1ays and *Icans
on H.R. 5496, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 82-124 (1935). See also Jessup, The Anti-Slarlgling
Act of 1935, 31 Am. J. I='L L. 101, 105 (1937): "In short, Professor Yntema and the
Treasury Department argued that the only test of the extent to which a nation may e:%tend
its jurisdiction in proximate areas of the high seas is the test of reasonableness. It is
believed that this is a sound position under international law." Gidel, M.e:orandwnn 30-31,
emphasizes technological factors, such as the increased speed of ships, and the fact that the
Act is limited in both duration and degree of comprehensiveness, to justify the large area
claimed, and concludes that, "nothing could be further from a claim of the old-fashioned
kind to 'sovereignty' over the high seas." See also Briggs, supra note 104, at 240-55;
Roberton, Anti-Simuggling Bill-nrisdctlion on the High Seas, 35 Micu. L. REv. 1146
(1937).
113. Frangois, Report on the Regime of thc Territorial Sea 11-15 (U.N. Doe. No.
A/CN.4/53) (1952) (Report to Int'l Law Comm'n). This count does not, of course, in-
dude nations claiming territorial seas of four, six, twelve, twenty-five, fifty or two hundred
miles, but only those claiming customs zones outside territorial seas. For texts of most
national laws relating to customs zones, see LAWs AXID REGLLATio.S o. TUE REiuE OF
THE HIGH SEAs (U.N. Doc. No. ST/LEG/SER. B/i) (1951).
114. Fran~ois, supra note 113, at 49.
115. 1 Mlooan, DIGEST OF IxTER-ATIONAL LAW 723-24 (1906). The United States pro-
tested this action at the time, but later conceded its correctness. 1 Wn,-aro:., DirEsT oF
I-TERNATIONAL LAW 108-09 (1886).
116. See INTERNATIONAL CONFERE NCES OF AmRzcAN STATES, 1933-1940, p. 334 (1st
Supp. 1940), reprinted in 34 Ams. J. Ixr'L L. Sur,. 17 (1940).
117. Masterson, supra mote 110, at 860.
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legality, 18 the Declaration at least indicates unanimity among the American
republics on the principle that authority may be exercised over considerable
areas of the high seas in defense of neutrality. Moreover, the opinions of in-
fluential publicists indicate that the principle asserted by the Declaration was
sound, and that objections to enforcement of the zone could be valid only
in so far as its operation in particular instances could be shown to be un-
reasonable." 9
The most influential single factor in producing recurrent opposition to
attempts to extend the limits of territorial seas has perhaps been the interest
of states in fisheries along foreign coasts. Yet the indiscriminate use of trawls,
floating factories, explosives, and other potentially destructive fishing methods
made possible by modern technology has forced widespread recognition of the
legality, if not of extended territorial waters, of contiguous zones for the
regulation of fisheries. For years urged only by scholars,'-" the contiguous
zone for fishery conservation was given resounding approval in the historic
proclamation of 1945,121 by which the United States announced a new policy
of establishing conservation zones in areas of the high seas contiguous to
American coasts. The proclamation contained a variety of provisions safe-
guarding the interests of other states in fisheries to be regulated, and an offer
to recognize similar rights of control by other states, on condition that the
interests of United States nationals be appropriately safeguarded. In addition
to the United States, at least twelve other bodies politic assert the right to
control fisheries beyond territorial waters. 122 While the claims of some of
these have been widely deprecated, the United States claim has been viewed
with approval by many influential commentators.123  Most significantly, no
118. For the texts of belligerents' replies see 2 DEP'T STATE BULL. 199, 201, 203 (19-10).
119. Brown, Protective Jurisdiction, 34 AM. J. INT'L L. 112 (1940); Fenwick, The
Declaration of Panama, 34 id. 116; The Exercise of Jurisdiction for Special Purposes in
High Seas Areas beyond the Outer Limit of Territorial Waters, address by W. W. Bishop,
Jr. before the Inter-American Bar Association, May 1949, pp. 4-5; Masterson, supra note
110, at 862-63. Cf. Gidel, Memorandum 34.
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru supported the idea of an equiva-
lent declaration during World War I. See [1914] FOREIGN REL. U.S. Sui'P. 435 et seq.
(1928). For neutrality zones outside territorial waters maintained by the United States
during World War I, see the Act of March 4, 1917, 39 STAT. 1194, 99 U.S. OFF. BULL. 8
(1917).
120. See, e.g., BINGHAM, REPORT ON THE LAW OF PACIFIC COASTAL FISnERIES (1938)
RIESENFELD, PROTECTION OF COASTAL FISHERIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 282 (1942).
121. Presidential Proclamation No. 2668, 59 STAT. 885 (1945).
122. Boggs, National Claim-s in Adjacent Seas, 41 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 185, 192-98
(1951) ; Franqois, Second Report on the High Seas 50 (U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/42)
(1951) (Report to Int'l Law Comm'n).
123. See Gidel, Memorandum 36-48, emphasizing, in support of the reasonableness of
the United States claim, advances in technology, the need for conservation, and the fact
that the United States claims powers of regulation for conservation purposes, rather than
monopoly. Lauterpacht, Sovereignty over Submarine Ireas, 27 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L, L. 376,
407-08 (1950), asserts the opinion that the U.S. claim is "not necessarily inconsistent with
a rational interpretation of the principle of the freedom of the seas so long as its primary
[Vol. 641:648
1955] HYDROGEN BOMB TESTS IN PERSPECTIVE 671
state has protested the 1945 Proclamation, although a number of states
promptly took exception to the more ambitious claims of Chile, Peru, El
Salvador, and others.2
For centuries states have exercised authority over the high seas in order
to regulate sedentary fisheries. Attempts have been made to distinguish these
assertions as claims to the sea-bed rather than the seas,1-'z or as mere histori-
cal exceptions to freedom of the seas ;12( but licenses have been required, ships
seized and jurisdiction assumed over violators of regulations designed to pro-
mote conservation or monopoly, and it seems clear that claims of modern
origin are as lawful as those of more ancient lineage.'- Unilateral claims to
exercise national authority over a total of thousands of square miles of high
seas for this purpose are today asserted by Ceylon, Australia, Tunis, Ireland,
Venezuela, Panama, and states bordering the Persian Gulf.-' 8 The Interna-
tional Law Commission has recently indicated that it regards with equanimity
the enforcement even of monopolistic regulations.'"
Perhaps the most spectacular development in the regime of the high seas
in recent years has been the quick acceptance of the validity of national
claims to the continental shelf. The continental shelf is the gently sloping
plain which underlies the high seas adjacent to most land masses, extend-
ing seaward from shore to a depth of 10) fathoms.1"O Discovery of extensive
oil reserves under the continental shelf in many areas, and development
of techniques of drilling for oil at sea, have given rise to a multitude of
unilateral claims to "jurisdiction and control" or "sovereignty" over the
object is not the exclusion of nationals of foreign states," and elsewhere speaks of the
"reasonable requirements of economic life and scientific progress," "intrinsic reasonable-
ness," and "the ever -alid test of reasonableness." Id. at 403, 406, 407. See also Bingham,
The Continental Shelf and the Marginal Belt, 40 As. J. IxT"L L. 173 (1946) ; Jessup, The
Pacific Coast Fisheries, 33 id. 129 (1939); Selak, Recent Development in High Seas
Fisheries Jurisdiction under the Presidential Proclamation of 1045, 44 id. 670 (1950);
Allen, The Fishery Proclamation of 1945, 45 id. 177 (1951); Chapman, United States
Policy on High Seas Fisheries, 20 DET ST,,E BLULL. 67 (1949).
124. LAws AND REGULATIONS ON THE REGIME OF TH1E HIGH Sr--,s 5, 7, 18 (U.N. Doc.
No. ST/LEG/SER. B/1) (1951); Fran ois, Fourth Report on the Regine of the Hiqlh
Seas, Continental Shelf and Related Subjiects 37 (U.N. Doc. Nu. A/C.N.4/W0) (1953) (Re-
port to Int'l Law Comm'n); Comments by Governments 113 (U.N. Doe. No. A/CNA/19)
(1950) (replies to Intl Law Comm'n questionnaire) ; Selak, supra note 123, at 673-74.
125. See, e.g., Hurst, Whose is the Bed of the Sea?, 4 BRIr. Y.B. INT'L L 34 (1933).
126. See, e.g., HIGGINS & COLOMEOS, INTERNATIONAL L.W F THE SEA § 73 (2d ed.,
Colombos 1951).
127. Gidel, Memorandum 73-74; Bingham, Juridical Status of the Continental Shelf,
26 So. CALIF. L. REv. 4 (1952); Goldie, Australia's Continental Shelf, 3 INa'L & Conrp.
L.Q. 535, 569-72 (1954).
128. Franqois, Second Report on the High Seas 51-62 (U.N. Dc. No. A/CN.4/42)
(1951) (Report to Int'l Law Comm'n).
129. International Law Commission, Report, U.N. GEnAML AssE inL" OFF. Rsc., 8th
Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 14 (Doc. No. A/2456) (1953).
130. See, generally, BoL'Rcr, G-OGRAPHIE DU FOxDS DES Mms, EL'JE tiL RELiEr
DES OctANs (1949).
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continental shelves adjacent to the shores of claimant states. These claims
have produced endless discussion by international lawyers and scholars
which has been particularly enlightening upon the compatibility of the legal
regime of the high seas with activities which necessarily interfere with com-
plete freedom of navigation and fishing.
Development of international prescriptions about the continental shelf began
with the Treaty of Paria,131 concluded in 1942 between the United Kingdom
and Venezuela. Pursuant to the treaty, Britain and Venezuela each annexed
one half of the sea-bed of the Gulf of Paria, stipulating, however, that the
seas above should retain their legal character as high seas.'8 2 In 1945, in con-
junction with the fisheries proclamation, President Truman issued a proclama-
tion declaring that the United States regarded the natural resources of the
sub-soil and sea-bed of the continental shelf contiguous to the United States
as "appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and con-
trol."'1 33 The proclamation further provided that the character as "high seas"
of the waters above the continental shelf, and the right to free and unimpeded
navigation were to be deemed unaffected by the declaration. Subsequently,
thirteen nations, nine Middle East sheikdoms and four British colonies have
promulgated similar or even more extensive claims.'
3 4
In spite of the proviso relating to "high seas" in the United States and
other declarations, nearly every commentator who has examined the question
has conceded that freedom of navigation and fishing must inevitably be
affected by development of the continental shelf.'33 Nevertheless, the opinion
of international jurists is nearly unanimous to the effect that no prescription
of international law forbids such development, and Lauterpacht, among others,
asserts that a customary rule of law permitting jurisdiction and control over
undersea areas has by now been established.' 30
Commentators have agreed, first of all, that individual states and the whole
world community have a substantial interest in promoting development of
undersea resources. 137 They observe the importance of such resources to lit-
131. LAWS AND REGULATIONS ON THE REGIME OF THE HIGH SEAs 44 (U.N. Doc. No.
ST/LEG/SER. B/i) (1951).
132. Id. at 45-46, 47.
133. Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, 59 STAT. 884 (1945); LAWS AND RmtLA-
TIONS ON THE REGIME OF THE HIGH SEAS, op. cit. sutpra note 131, at 38.
134. Id. at 23-37.
135. See, e.g., Gidel, Memorandum 86; Goldie, supra note 127, at 550-51 (1954) ; Lau-
terpacht, Sovereignty over Submarine Areas, 27 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 376, 412 (1950).
136. Id. at 376-77, 431; Bingham, Juridical Status of the Continental Shelf, 26 So,
CALIF. L. REv. 4 (1952) ; Goldie, supra note 127, at 559.
137. The general sequence of thought indicated in the balance of the text paragraph
has been followed most explicitly by Gidel, Memorandum 48-112; Bingham, supra note
136, passim; Lauterpacht, supra note 135, passim. See also International Law Commission,
Report, U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY OFF. REC. 8th Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 12-16 (Doe. No.
A/2456) (1953) ; Borchard, Resources of the Continental Shelf, 40 Am. J. INT L L. 53
(1946) ; Briggs, Jurisdictionr over the Sea Bed and Subsoil beyond Territorial Waters, 45
id. 338 (1951) ; Brown, Protective Jurisdiction over Marginal Waters, 47 id. 452 (1953) ;
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toral states and the fact that security considerations would impel states to
oppose violently any developmental operations near their shores which they
could not control, and conclude that the policy of avoiding dashes of interest
between states overrides the traditional policy against monopolistic claims. They
note that interference with navigation and fishing is certain to ensue, but that
such interference would be slight, and in any event would be more than
balanced by the interests served by permitting utilization of the resources of
the shelf. Frequently, they caution that developmental projects might infringe
international law if undertaken in areas peculiarly vital to navigation. In
short, the commentators foresee that the interference with other states' claims
to rights of navigation, fishing and other uses will ordinarily be reasonable,
and conclude that reasonable claims to use, jurisdiction, control, or even
"sovereignty" over the continental shelf are not inconsistent with the regime
of the high seas.13s
Further rich illustration of the practice of states and process of community
decision concerning claims in adjacent seas comparable to that with respect
to customs, fishing, neutrality, and the resources of the sea-bed and conti-
nental shelf, could be offered with respect to virtually every identifiable in-
terest of coastal states.139 The most recent information indicates that no less
than forty states claim one or more contiguous zones or recognize the validity
of claims asserted by others. 40 It may therefore be observed, as a matter of
objective fact, that reasonable claims to contiguous zones for one or more
purposes are thoroughly accepted in the practice of states.141 The standard
of decision with respect to all claims has of necessity been no more explicit
than reasonableness, determined ad hoc in the light of all relevant policies,
conditions, and alternatives. The maritime frontiers of the world are, thus,
not sharp lines between national sovereignty and "anarchy, euphemisti-
cally known as 'freedom of the sea,' ,,142 but areas extending beyond terri-
Goldie, supra note 127, passim; Trigg, National Stoereignty over Maritime Resources, 9
U. PA. L. Rwv. 82 (1950); Young, Recenst Developents nith Respect to the Continental
Shelf, 42 Am. J. I"r'L L. 849 (1948).
138. With the authorities cited note 137 supra, contrast Margolis, p. 634, asserting
that "the legal justification for such claims is far from clear." Even the International Law
Commission, which has understandably been extremel) diffident in endursing prin~ciples nut
already established, has adopted articles which would uphold claims tw the continental
shelf. Report, supra note 137, at 12-16. The Commission stated: "The case is clearly one
of assessment of the relative importance of the interests involved. Interference, even iU
substantial, with navigation and fishing might, in some cases, be justifid." Id. at 15. Yet
"that principle is in no way incompatible with the principle of freedom of the sea." Id. at 14.
139. See generally Boggs, ANational Claims ins Adjacent Seas, 41 G~oc.rut'nc,%L REv.
185 (1951); Francois, Report on the Regime of the Territorial Sea (U.N. Doc. No.
A/CN.4/53) (1952) (Report to Int'l Law Comm'n).
140. Boggs, supra note 139, at 192-201; Franqois, supra note 139, at 11-15.
141. The two-sentence reference to this great development in Margolis, p. 634, is
scarcely adequate recognition of its importance.
142. Quoted from RIESENFELD, Pro crxio. OF COASTAL FisnEnms UNDER IxEmIA-
TioNAL LAw 2 (1942).
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torial waters for distances ranging up to hundreds of miles, in which states
exercise competences of descending comprehensiveness for the most diverse
purposes.1
43
Because of their peculiar relevance to the hydrogen bomb tests, the asser-
tion and honoring of claims with respect to defense and security bear further
elaboration.
THE SPECIAL DEFERENCE ACCORDED TO CLAIMs FOR SECURITY 144
In the absence of a centralized authority capable of maintaining public
order, nation-states have always demanded for themselves and accorded to
others a wide measure of freedom in unilateral action for maintaining their
own security against external dictation by unlawful violence or threats of
violence.145 This has been especially true in the domain of the international
143. One is at a loss to discern the relevance, and even the meaning, of Dr. Margolis' dis-
tinction between "general" and "special" police powers. Margolis, pp. 634-36. Tile dis-
tinction is apparently an effort to force all claims to exercise authority on the high seas
into a dichotomy borrowed from Gidel, who used it only to describe certain powers attrib-
uted to men-of-war. See 1 GIDEL, DROIr INTERNATIONAL DE LA ME2 288 et seq. (1932);
Gidel, Memorandum 4, 9-10. The descriptive use of the terms seems to be a shifting refer-
ence from the modality by which claims are asserted, to the area in which claims are
asserted. Thus, "general police powers" may "be exercised independently of treaty rights,"
emerging "'purely and simply' from custom" and are not "limited to particular maritime
zones." See Margolis, p. 634 n.33. In contrast, "'special police measures' exist only by
virtue of treaties, and apply exclusively to the states which are parties to them." Ibid.
Obviously neither description fits the United States claim, but neither, does it describe some
hundreds of other claims which are of ancient origin and unquestionably lawful.
Only the preferential use of the terms is made completely explicit: the category of
"general" police powers is projected as a closed one, confined to certain ancient practices,
and all "special" police powers must be created by agreement; hence, decision-makers are
blocked off from honoring any new claims not created by agreement. Ibid. Such preferen-
tial projections obviously do not, however, accord with the preferences that the authori-
tative decision-makers of the world community have embodied in their decisions in the
past and no reason is offered why any one should accept such preferences for the future.
Certainly the words "general" and "special" are at a level of abstraction which offers no
particular policy guidance and vague references to "creation by treaty" and "particular
maritime zones" adds insufficient factual context to justify any kind of conclusion.
144. "Security" may be most broadly conceived as high position, potential, and ex-
pectancy with respect to all values. LASSWELL & KAPLAN, POWER AND SocIErY 61, (1950).
Thus defined, it underlies all of the claims outlined above, beginning with the claims to
navigation and fishing and continuing across the spectrum to claims of sovereignty over
territorial seas. For more than usual explicitness in justification of claims to territorial
seas and contiguous zones in terms of security, self-defense, and self-preservation, see
JESSUP, LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS passim (1927). Cf. Gidel, Memorandum 45; 12
FUR SEAL ARBITRATION, PROCEEDINGS 254-56 (1895).
In this section, however, we use the term "security" in a more restricted sense of free-
dom from external dictation by unlawful military violence or threats of violence.
145. Considerations of self-defense and self-preservation have historically played a
most important role in the prescriptive formulations of an imperfectly organized world
community. See, e.g., 2 GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACdS 195 (Kelsey trans. 1925) ; 3
VATTEI, DROIT DES GENS 149, 274 (Fenwick trans. 1916). See also 1 FAUCuILLE, TRAIT
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law of the sea, where it is with respect to claims which bear upon national
security that prescriptions and concepts exhibit their highest degree of flexi-
bility.
The primacy of security-interests in the law of the sea is suggested by the
historical fact that prescriptions authorizing the unilateral suppression of
"piracy"---criminal acts and depredations upon the high seas not attributable
to any state-antedate even "freedom of the seas" in its "modern" sense.140
Indeed, the phrase "freedom of the seas" itself was, before Grotius, a popular
characterization of efforts to liberate the high seas from the atrocities and
robberies perpetrated by pirates 47 Because of their common interest in re-
pressing unlawful violence on the high seas the states of the world community
have agreed since antiquity that there should be "universal" jurisdiction with
respect to piracy.1 48 A state may thus exercise jurisdiction over piratical ships
and their crews without regard to the locus of the crime, the flag flown, the
nationality of injured parties, or any other normal indicia of jurisdiction. 40
Of more contemporary importance is the fact that the prescriptions pro-
tecting navigation and fishing, like most other important prescriptions in both
international and municipal law, have always yielded to claims of self-defense.
In the much-discussed case of the Firgz'nius,1 90 Spanish forces seized an
American vessel on the high seas en route to Cuba carrying arms for insur-
gents, and summarily executed a number of American citizens and British
subjects on board. Britain sought reparations for this treatment of its sub-
D DR oiT IxTERNATioNAL PUBLIC § 242 (8th ed. 1922); H-LL, INTERNAMToNAL LAw C. 7
(8th ed., Higgins 1924) ; 1 HYDE, INTERNATIOxAL LAW 763 (2d ed. 1945) ; Jsssu,, LAW
OF TERRITORIAL WATERS 96 (1927) ; 1 PHILL TORE, INxEATiONAL LAW c. 10 (3d ed.
1879).
Even the most contemporary expression of world organization, the United Nations,
confirms and perhaps broadens self-help sanctions against armed attack. See U.N.
CHAR=a art. 51, which speaks not only of "self-defense,' but "collective self-defense."
The importance of Article 51 in view of the veto-imposed impotence of the Security Coun-
cil has often been noted, and the considerations which underlie it find concrete embodi-
ment in the new regional organizations. See generally BEcKmT, THE Nora ATL.ANT1c
TREAr, THE BRUSSELS TREATYv, AND THE CHARTER OF THE UErrm NATIO.-S 13-15 (1950) ;
BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS 986 (2d ed. 1952); KELsEN, RECENT TnRnDs IN TE LAw
oF THE UxlrD NATio.',s 914 (1951) ; MARTIN, COLLECTIVE SECUITY: A Pnornmss Rzaonr
169 (1952); 2 0PPE nEIm-LAtTERPACHr 156-57; STo,, LEGAL CONTROLS 0F IN TERZNA-
TIONAL CONFLICT 262-65 (1954) ; Bebr, Regional Organications: A United Nations Prob-
lem, 49 Am. J. INTL L. No. 2 (1955) ; Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by
Individual States in International Law, 81 HAGUE RECIEIL 455, 504 (1952).
146. Gidel, Memorandum 1. For statement of authoritative prescriptions, collection
of citations, and discussion see HARva.RD RFFsFRc D,.wFr Ox Pm.c" (1932), printed in
26 Am. J. I-NT'L L. Supp. 743 (1932) ; Lenoir, Piracy Cases in the Suprene Court, 25
J. Ctu. L. & CRIIxOLOGY 532 (1934).
147. Gidel, Memorandum 1.
148. HARvARD RESEARCH DRAFT ON J'RIsDicriov OF CRimE art. 9, comment (1935).
149. HARVARD REsA cn, op. cit. supra note 146, at 757; HARVARD RESEArCIu, op. cit.
supra note 148, at 563 et seq.
150. 2 MooRE DIGEST OF IxTERxAT ONAL LAW 895-903, 980-83 (1906).
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jects, but conceded the legality of the seizure under the circumstances of the
case.' 51 The United States withdrew its initial protest, and subsequently
adopted the British view of the right of self-defense as its own., 2 It is hardly
surprising that action in self-defense may be taken on the high seas, since
the same principle is considered to justify actual invasion of foreign territory.
In the case of the Caroline,5 3 Canadian forces invaded the United States
and destroyed the vessel, which was to be employed by Canadian insurgents
and American sympathizers in an impending attack on Canada which the
United States was unable to prevent. The British in 1807 seized the Danish
fleet to avoid its use by Russia,15 4 and in 1940 destroyed the French fleet at
Oran to prevent its falling into the hands of German forces. 155 It is authori-
tative community prescription, as well as unilateral claim, that every sover-
eign state must have, in the words of Elihu Root, "the right . . . to protect
itself by preventing a condition of affairs in which it will be too late to pro-
tect itself."'I50 Since, as has been noted, the world community has no centrally
organized police force, self-help is often the only rational alternative for main-
taining public order, whether the threat to that order is posed by individuals
responsive to the authority of no state, or by the instrumentalities of states
themselves.
Claims to contiguous zones for specific security purposes-wholly apart
from the preeminence of "security" as a general justification for many differ-
ent kinds of contiguous zone claims ' 5 -- are today asserted by at least eight-
een states, 5 8 exclusive of the claims to extensive neutrality zones already
considered. 150 As expectations of the most comprehensive violence have in-
creased in recent years, the number and extent of such claims has increased,
with no noticeable protest from the international community.
151. Id.at983.
152. For espousal by the United States of the doctrine of self-defense upon the high
seas, see 12 FuR SEAL ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS 101-04, 246-49 (1895). For approval of
the British stand in the matter of the girginius, see, e.g., BRIERLY, THE LAW or NATIOZIq
228 (4th ed. 1949); HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 328-30 (8th ed., Higgins 1924); HIGINs
& CoLolMos, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA § 274 (2d ed., Colombos 1951); I Hr'DF,
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 68 (2d ed. 1945) ; J Essup, LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS 97 (1929) ; 1
WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 171 (1910).
153. HALL, op. cit. supra note 152, at 323-24. See also 1 HytE, op. cit. supra note 152,
§ 66; JEssup, op. cit. supra note 152, at 76, 97, arguing that since "the great principle od
inviolability of national territory is qualified by the right of self-defense," a fortiori free,
dom of the seas is subject to the same qualification.
154. HALL, op. cit. supra note 152, at 326-28; Kurlsrud, The Seizure of the Danish
Fleet, 1807, 32 Am. J. INTL L. 280 (1938).
155. 1 OPPENHEI-M-LAUTERPACHT 270-71.
156. Root, The Real Monroe Doctrine, 8 Amd. J. INTL L. 427, 432 (1914).
157. See note 144 supra.
158. Boggs, National Claims in Adjacent Seas, 41 GEOGRAI'HICAL REv. 185, 192-201
(1951) ; text at notes 161, 167, 180 infra.
159. See text at notes 115-19 supra.
[Vol. 64:&48
1955] HYDROGEN BOMB TESTS IN PERSPECTIVE 677
The impact of modem technology upon these demands for security is most
dramatically illustrated by the claims recently asserted by the United States
and Canada to exercise jurisdiction for security purposes in the airspace over-
lying vast areas of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. 6 0 In 1950, the United
States established certain "Air Defense Identification Zones" (ADIZ), de-
fined as
"Air space ...designated by the administrator of Civil Aeronautics
within which the ready identification, location and control of aircraft is
required in the interest of national security."' 0'
Flight plans must be filed for both domestic and foreign flights before enter-
ing an ADIZ, 0 2 and position reports must be made by foreign aircraft which
are bound for the United States, upon entering an ADIZ or "when the air-
craft is not less than one hour... cruising distance via the most direct route,
from the United States."'' 1 Knowing or willful violators of these regulations
are guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction may be subjected to penal-
ties ranging up to $10,000 fine and one year's imprisonment.104 The Atlantic
ADIZ extends seaward more than 250 miles, the Pacific ADIZ more than
300 miles, 16 5 and in the case of a high-speed aircraft jurisdiction would be
assumed at one hour's cruising distance, potentially 600 or more miles.'60
In 1951, Canada promulgated similar regulations, providing for the creation
of Canadian Air Defence Identification Zones extending seaward up to 180
miles, in which a similar type of jurisdiction over aircraft was asserted.'0"
The Canadian regulations are less stringent than those of the United States
in that the zones are smaller, and the regulations do not apply to aircraft
flying at altitudes of less than 4000 feet.0 8 They are stricter, however, in that
position reports must be made by foreign aircraft within defense zones whether
or not they are bound for Canada or its territorial waters.' c9 Violation of the
Canadian regulations renders the aircraft "liable to interflight interception by
military interceptor aircraft."' 70 Neither the United States nor the Canadian
claim has elicited any protest, so far as is known, and at least one commen-
160. The regime of the high seas is generally considered to apply to superjacent air-
space For citations, see Baiors, THE LAW OF NATIONS 323-26 (2d ed. 1952).
161. 14 C.F.R. § 6202(b) (Supp. 1954).
162. Id.,§ 620.11.
163. Id., § 620.12(b) (2). For the slightly more stringent position-reporting regulations
to which domestic aircraft are subjected, see id., § 620.12(a).
164. Id., § 620.18. For the statutory basis of these regulations, see the 1950 Amend-
ment to the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, at 64 ST.T. 825 (1950), 49 U.S.C. §§ 701-05
(1952).
165. 14 C.F.R. §§ 620.22(a)-(b) (Supp. 1954).
166. See note 163 supra.
167. CANADA D , T oF TRANSPORT, RtULES FOR THE SECURITY CU-NTrOL OF Am TrAric
(NOTAM 22, 1954).
168. Id., para. 2.1(a).
169. Id., para. 2.
170. Id., para. 2.10.1.
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tator has concluded with little difficulty that both sets of regulations are valid
under international law.
171
Among the claims asserted in the name of "security" are certain claims to
exclusive use of high seas areas for peacetime naval and military exercises
or maneuvers, sometimes implemented by a claim to civil or criminal juris-
diction for enforcement purposes. Although such claims may be traced in-
directly to antiquity,172 their legality has apparently seldom been questioned
or even discussed. It is this class of claims to which generically the claim
made by the United States in connection with its thermonuclear bomb tests
belongs.
It has already been observed that the activities of ships themselves some-
times constitute a noticeable interference with the navigation of others, par-
ticularly in the case of trawlers, dredges, cableships, and naval vessels in for-
mation or engaged in maneuvers, and that such vessels can get sea room by
making appropriate signals.' 73 With the increased range of naval guns and
coastal artillery, and the appearance of increasingly dangerous devices of naval
warfare, states with extensive naval forces found it necessary to institutional-
ize some of their peacetime defensive activities in order to minimize conflict
between those activities and commercial navigation and fishing. Exercises in-
volving the use of modern weapons could not be conducted with safety except
in relatively unfrequented areas, and, moreover, mariners preferred to avoid
exercise areas altogether rather than to be delayed and endangered by un-
expected encounters. New means of communication made it possible to sup-
plement, if not to displace visual signalling as a means of reducing inter-
ference between navigation and dangerous defensive activities.
171. Martial, State Control of the Air Space over the Territorial Sea and the Con-
tiguous Zone, 30 CAN. B. REV. 245 (1952).
172. From the earliest times, various commentators have found it necessary to accord
special consideration to the status of war fleets in peace. Grotius contended that "sover-
eignty," as opposed to "ownership" over a sea area could be acquired by stationing a fleet
there. 2 GROTIus, DE JURE BELLI AC PACis 214 (Kelsey trans. 1925). See also I PnxLLi-
MORE, COIMfENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW 290-91 (3d ed. 1879) : "The portion of
sea actually occupied by a fleet riding at anchor is within the dominion of the nation to
which the fleet belongs, so long as it remains there; that is, for all purposes of jurisdiction
over persons within the limits of the space so occupied." For criticism of an incorrect
paraphrase of the passage quoted, see 1. OPPENIIEIM-LAUTERPACIIT 540 n.4.
While claims to "sovereignty" over sea areas have never in fact been made on the basis
of occupation by naval forces, several authorities have asserted that naval vessels in for-
mation or engaged in maneuvers should be accorded the right of way at sea under all
circumstances, 1 GIDEL, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC DE LA MER, 360; DE RycKciaR, DRiOIr
MARITI-ME BELGE 509 (1913), and the "Special Circumstances" and "General Precautionary"
rules have occasionally been so interpreted. See the Sanspareil [19C0] P. 267; GnRIriN,
COLLISIONS § 230 (1949) ; HILBERT, INTFRNATIONAL RULES OF THE ROAD AT SEA 1,0 (1938).
The British Admiralty has categorically asserted that it is the duty of a single vessel to
keep out of the way of a squadron or convoy. Admiralty Notices to Mariners, Jan. 1, 1954,
pp. 39-40 (weekly ed.).
173. See text at note 77 supra.
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Naval powers therefore began the practice of conducting their more dan-
gerous maneuvers and defensive activities in circumscribed areas selected with
a view to creating the least possible interference with navigation and fishing.
M[ariners throughout the world were advised, through national hydrographic
offices and other channels of information relating to navigation,17 4 that desig-
nated areas would be unsafe for navigation either indefinitely or at certain
times. The United States has established well over 400 such areas, ranging
in size from less than a square mile to the vast area surrounding Bikini and
Eniwetok Atolls, and in duration from a period of a few hours to many
years.175 Other naval powers, including the United Kingdom, Canada, Aus-
tralia, and the Soviet Union, have engaged in the same practice for similar
purposes. 176 Ordinarily, no claim is made to enforce warning areas by means
of formal sanctions, and the normal responsibility for taking reasonable
measures at the scene to avoid accidents is considered to rest with the authorities
using the areas for dangerous operations.' 7 7 Some danger areas are, however,
174. As every mariner knows, a network of national and international organizations
cooperate to make available to mariners throughout the world information relating to
hazards to navigation, such as warning and danger areas, wrecks, missing or inkiperative
lights and buoys, oil-well structures, minefields, blockades, recently discovered reeds, and
so on. See generally Admiralty Notices to Mariners, supra note 172, at 50-52, 155; U.S.
Navy Hydrographic Office, Notice to Mariners (Special) 25-42 (Jan. 1, 1954). Some
forty-one nations and the International Hydrographic Office at Monte Carlo, Mo naco, co-
operate in the distribution of notices to mariners. Id. at 30. For description of tie services
provided by the U.S. Navy Hydrographic Office, see its l..For. rlxx Hyvcrcin Pnic
OFFncE CiaARTs & PuBLIc.Tioxs (H.O. Circular No. 3, 1954).
175. N.Y. Times, April 1, 1954, p. 20, col. 2. For numerous examples, see any issue of
U.S. Navy Hydrographic Office, Notice to Mariners (weekly ed.); U.S. Dri'T oF Co' T-
mRcE, RESTRICTED, DANGER AND AxCHORAGE AREAs 94, 104, 118, 120, 134, 149, 156, 201
(Ser. No. 693, 1947) ; Admiralty Notices to Mariners, supra note 172, at 37.
176. See, e.g., Admiralty Notices to 'Mariners, supra note 172, at 37, 39-40, 67 (United
Kingdom), 178 (Yugoslavia, Greece), 187 (Australia), 190 (Venezuela, United States);
U.S. DEPT OF COmmiERcE, op. cit. supra note 175, at 200, 201 (Canada) ; Soiet Notices to
'Mariners, Nos. 717, 935, 936 (1947), 1121, 2446 (1954) (translations on file in Yale Law
Library). See also text at notes 180-34 infra. For a chart depicting a zone of approximately
50,000 square miles, extending from Florida out into the Atlantic and across the Bahamas,
used jointly by the United States and Britain for the testing of long-range guidcd misgiles.
see GT. Bar. FoPmarG OFF. TRF-NTY SEn. No. 74, at 14 (1950).
It is the usual international practice for nations issuing navigation notices to supply
copies to other maritime nations, which reprint them in their own languages for the infor-
mation of their mariners. Examples of recent Soviet practice are few, since the SOviet
Union stopped supplying the United States with Notices to Mariners in 1947, giving no
reason, and then, in 1954, again giving no reason, suddenly resumed supplying them. See
Admiralty Notices to Mariners, supra note 172, at 175.
177. U.S. Hydrographic Office, Notice to 'Mariners (special) 15-16 (Jan. 1, 1954);
Admiralty Notices to Mariners, supra note 172, at 37.
It seems likely that the practice of creating warning areas by dissemination of advance
notice by radio and printed memoranda evolved naturally from visual signalling, and that
if it had ever been questioned, states would have defended it as an exercise of "freedt.,m
of the seas." Thus, states" attempts to prevent foreign naval forces from engaging in gun-
nery practice outside territorial waters, but within range of shore, have been defended, in
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announced in terms which make clear that the authorities using them are
expected to enforce observance.
7 8
In rare instances, criminal penalties are provided for unauthorized intru-
sions. 17a In the Defence (Special Undertakings) Act of 1952,180 the Com-
monwealth of Australia created a prohibited area of more than 6000 square
miles, most of it high seas, 8" surrounding one of the Monte Bello Islands in
western Australia, where atomic tests have been conducted by the United
Kingdom. 8 2 Persons entering the area without permission are made subject
to penalties ranging up to seven years' imprisonment. 83  The Act empowers
the Minister to declare other restricted areas whenever it is "necessary so to
do for the protection of a special defence undertaking," defined as any work
or undertaking carried on within or without Australia, relating to the defense
of itself, "some other part of the Queen's dominions or of some other country
associated with Australia in resisting or preparing to resist international
aggression.' 18 4 No protest by any nation against the Act has been reported.
The especially privileged status in world prescription of claims to exercise
authority and control upon the high seas for purposes of security, even in time
of "peace," is particularly confirmed by the practice of Great Britain. Al-
though that nation is usually considered to have altered its previous attitude
and is counted among the few states which oppose claims to contiguous zones
generally, it has followed a consistent course of approving the widest freedom
of decision for itself and for other states in matters affecting defense and
security.18 5 This attitude, shared as we have seen by other states equally
effect, as reasonable infringements of freedom of the seas. Letter from Secretary of State
Bayard to Secretary of the Treasury Manning, May 28, 1886, in 1 WHARTON, DxrtST oF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 107-09 (2d ed. 1887) ; HARVARD RESEARCHi DRAFT ON TERRITORIAL
WATERS 335-36 (1929). Moreover, although it seems certain that every state with naval
forces or even shore batteries has always claimed the right to use the seas outside terri-
torial waters for dangerous defensive activities in time of peace, only Belgium thought it
necessary to mention this claim in its reply to the Preparatory Committee for the 1930
Codification Conference. See 2 PREPARATORY COMMITTEE OF THE CONFERENE FOR 'HE
CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, BASES OF DISCUSSION 120 (League of Nations
Pub. No. C.74.M.39.1929.V).
178. "Restricted," "closed," and "prohibited" areas are announced in such terms, see,
e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, op. cit. supra note 175, at 95; Admiralty Notices to Mariners,
supra note 172, at 190; U.S. Navy Hydrographic Office, Notice to Mariners, pt. 2, No. 24,
para. 3168 (June 13, 1953), and are apparently differentiated carefully from "danger,"
"warning," and "caution" areas.
179. So far as is known, the United States has never laid claim to civil or criminal
jurisdiction to enforce exclusion from any warning area outside territorial waters, For
practice as to peacetime defensive sea areas within territorial waters, see note 100 supra;
cf. text at notes 160-66 supra.
180. 50 COMMONWEALTH ACTS 64 (1952).
181. Goldie, Australia's Continental Shelf, 3 INT'l. & Comp. L.Q. 535, 550 n.43 (1954).
182. N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1953, p. 3, col. 5.
183. 50 COMMONWEALTH ACTS 66,67 (1952).
184. Id. at 65, 67.
185. See notes 150-52 supra and accompanying text. Professor Smith, often a clear
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solicitous of "freedom of the seas," is eloquently expressed in the British
Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act of 1878, still in effect:
"'the rightful jurisdiction of Her Majesty. . . extends and has always
extended over the open sea adjacent to the coasts of the United King-
dom and of all other parts of Her Majesty's dominions, to such a di6-
tance as is necessary for the defense and security of such dominions." 181,
This traditional feature of British policy is most recently evidenced by her
obvious acquiescence in the Australian legislation enacted to facilitate Britain's
own atomic tests, and her apparent acquiescence in United States and Cana-
dian air defense regulations.
In time of acknowledged war "freedom of the seas" is, of course, subject
to exceptions so numerous and substantial as virtually to overwhelm the prin-
ciple itself. 87 Belligerents are authorized to conduct hostilities against each
other anywhere upon the oceans of the world, save in the territorial seas or
protective zones of neutrals, 8 8 and they have commonly rendered vast
stretches of the ocean unsafe for commercial navigation, paying but scant at-
tention to the claims of non-participants for neutrality zones.18 9 Even under
the older doctrines of contraband, unneutral service, blockade, ultimate desti-
nation, war zones, and reprisals, enforced by the procedures of visit and
search, and capture, a belligerent who has the effective power is authorized
spokesman of official British policy, has said: "Nearly a century has nuw lassed since the un-
satisfactory dispute with Spain [over British Hovering Acts] was allowed t.j die tut, and
since then the government of Great Britain has shown an increasing reluctance to resist
actively such claims by other states as can be justified on the principle of self-defeme." S!sITt,
THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA 21 (2d ed. 1950). See also Martial, State Control ol the
Air Space over the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 30 CAN. B. REV. 245, 203
(1952). For the opinion that Britain is opposed to contiguous zones only "to -,me extent,"
see Lauterpacht, Sovereignty over Submarine Areas, 27 BRIT. Y.B. INZt'. L 376, 40
(1950), citing Croft v. Dunphy, [1933] A.C. 156.
186. 41-42 Vicr. c. 73 (1878). Compare the statement by President Roosevelt that uur
territorial waters extend "as far as our interests require," quoted in Mastersn, The
Hemisphere Zone of Security and the Lau, 26 A.B.A.J. 860, 861-62 (1940).
187. Before turning from the subject of the law of the sea in time of "peace," it seems
appropriate to mention, for purposes of completeness, the institution of "pacific bloclmde,"
another practice which, before the advent of the United Nations Charter, was recogniztd
as lawful by many, and which enabled nation-states to control large areas of high seas in
time of "peace" on occasion for no better purpose than the collectit.n of delts. See gen-
erally GRoa, THE RELATnITY OF VAR AND PEACE (1949); HrnzImAnsn, FncE Ix Pr-%cF
(1933); HOGAN, PAcInc BLOCKADE (1908); Giraud, Memorandum on Pacific Blocklade,
LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J., 8th year 841 (1927); Washburn, The Legality of Pacific
Blockade, 21 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 227, 442 (1921).
188. HiGGixs & COLomrOS, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF TlE SEA c. 13 (2d ed., Colh.mlus
1951) ; 2 OPPENHEIIM-LAUTERPACHT § 181: SMITH, THE LAW AND C17sToM OF TIER SL-
148 (2d ed. 1950).
189. See, e.g., Masterson, The Hemisphere Zone of Security and the Lat, 26 A.B.A.J.
860, 863 (1940). For excellent illustration of the normative-ambiguity in "freedom of tht:
seas" in this context, see Reppy, The Grotian Doctrine of Freedom of the Seas Rcappraiscd,
19 FoRD. L. Rev. 243, 283 (1950).
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for all practical purposes to close the high seas to enemy-neutral commerce. 190
When policing procedures are supplemented not only by the more recent
technology of aircraft, submarines, and mines, but also by the new adminis-
trative practices of navicerts, rationing of neutrals, ship warrants, bunker con-
trol, insurance and credit control, and black listing,'' control may be made
even more complete, and the legal policy question becomes not merely whether
belligerents may close the oceans to enemy-neutral traffic but also whether
they may not order the observance of certain measures even within the terri-
torial boundaries of non-participants. In such a context, freedom of the seas,
even in its most rational sense, recedes almost completely in world prescrip-
tion before certain other values summed up in the military necessities of
bodies politic struggling for survival.
The Hydrogen Bomb Tests As Reasonable Measures for Security
The claim of the United States which is under discussion may be described
factually as a claim to use territory (Bikini and Eniwetok Atolls) over which
it has jurisdiction, for the purpose of conducting tests of thermonuclear
weapons, a use which has the effect of excluding others temporarily from
large surrounding areas of the high seas. The United States has established
warning zones from time to time which serve to inform mariners of the ex-
tent of the area in which danger exists.192 No authority to enforce observance
of warning zones has been asserted, but as a practical matter observance fol-
lows because of the danger from the tests themselves.0 3
The extent to which the bomb tests have actually interfered with commer-
cial navigation, in spite of the size of the area affected, is virtually nil. No
commercial maritime route crosses any part of the warning zones which have
been established, and the nearest sea route of any importance, that followed
by ships plying between Honolulu and Manila, passes some 165 miles north
of the outer edge of the largest warning zone.1 94 The next nearest trade route,
190. See, generally, HIGGINS & COLONIBOS, Op. cit. supra note 188, cc. 14, 16-18, 20;
SMITH, op. cit. supra note 188, cc. 8-14.
191. For description of modern techniques of controlling enemy-neutral commerce in
time of war, see, generally, 1 MEDLIcOTT, TIlE EcoNomIc BLOCKADE (1952); STONE,
LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT pts. 3, 4 (1954) ; Wu, EcONOMIC WARFARE
(1952). For outstanding analysis, see FELICIANO, LEGAL REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL
COERCION: STUDIES IN THE LAW OF WAR cc. 2, 3 (unpublished thesis in Yale Law Library
1954).
192. See text at notes 19-24 supra.
193. Thus far, authority to exclude others has been asserted only with respect to Bikini
and Eniwetok and their territorial waters. See Notices cited notes 20-23 supra. However,
at the time of the first atomic bomb tests at Bikini in 1946, the late Admiral Blandy
asserted that any intruders in the immediate test area would be ejected by force if neces-
sary. N.Y. Times, June 26, 1946, p. 7, col. 5.
194. U.S. Navy Hydrographic Office, Track Chart of the World (No. 1262, 27th ed.
1943) (excerpt reproduced opposite p. 650' supra); U.S. MARITIME COMM'N, ESSENTIAL
FOREIGN TRADE ROUTES 17, 28 (1949). See also Letter from Serge G. Koushnareff, Deputy
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Honolulu to the Torres Strait, lies 420 miles southeast of the warning zone
and some 660 miles from Bikini. 19 One commercial air route, that between
Wake Island and Guam, was deflected northward by the largest zone, making
it necessary for two to three flights weekly to follow a route fifty miles longer
than usual during the fifty-seven days that the zone was in effect.100 Analysis
of maritime routes indicates not only that interference with navigation caused
by the zones was slight, but that few if any sea areas of comparable size in the
world are less essential to international navigation, with tile possible exception
of the Antarctic.
197
Furthermore, the amount of interference with fishing caused by the exist-
ence of the warning zones appears to have been slight. Fishing for tuna, ship-
jack, and bonito has been carried on by the Japanese in waters which were
within the warning zones, but the minor character of the interference with fish-
ing attributable to the zones is indicated by the fact that in prewar years the
catch from the entire area of the Japanese Mandated Islands, of which the
zones covered only a small part, amounted to far less than one per cent in
value of the annual fisheries production of the Japanese Empire.108 The annual
tuna catch from the waters within the largest warning zone (400,00 square
Director, Transportation and Utilities Div., Bureau of Foreign Commerce, U.S. Dep't uf
Commerce, to the Yale Law Journal, Dec. 30, 1954, on file in Yale Law Library.
195. Track Chart of the World, supra note 194. No commercial shipping lines vi,it
the Trust Territory, U.N. Trusteeship Council Visiting Mission, Report on the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands 17-18 (Doe. No. T/1077) (1953), and the bulk of inter-
island transportation facilities in the Islands is owned or operated by the Administering
Authority. Ibid.; U.S. DE'T OF INTERIO, 1952-53 REPORT ON THE Aomi. sTm~wo:m oF THE
TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS 43-44 (1954).
196. Letter from J. B. Cooke, Jr., Ass't Division Operations Manager, Pacific-Alaska
Division, Pan-American World Airways System, San Francisco, Calif., to the Yale Law
Journal, Feb. 8, 1955, on file in Yale Law Library.
197. See Track Chart of the World, supra note 194.
198. U.S. DE'T OF INTERIOR, JAPAiN.EsE FIsHERiEs PoDucTioN 1903-1946, at 3, 20
(Fishery Leaflet 279, 1948) (reproduction of Report No. 95, Natural Resources Sectiun,
General Headquarters, Supreme Commander Allied Powers, Japan). Minimum fidhery pro-
duction of Japan during 1931-1938 wras 4,900,000 metric tons. Id. at 3. Maximum pro-
duction of the Japanese Mandated Islands, occurring in 1937, was 3,852 metric tons. While
Japan has lost a number of fisheries since World War II, so that the island fisheries now
may be relatively more important, they would have had to increase more than ten-fold in
importance to amount to 1% of total production.
Moreover, the warnings in effect from 1948 to 1954 affected a mere 1.0%
of the Bonin and Mandated Regions Area. See U.S. DEP'r OF INTEnion, Tn JAPANESE
TUNA FisERPizs 11 (Fishery Leaflet 297, 1948). The largest warning zone, in effect for
57 days in 1954, see note 23 supra, covered approximately 7c, of the Area. Ibid.
Fishing in the Territory of the Pacific Islands is apparently subject to hazards other
than occasional radioactivity. See U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, SURVY OF T " E FIsntnIEs oF
THE Fo. mR JAPA N-SE MANDATED ISLANDs 59-60, 79-81 (Fishery Leaflct 273, 1947), list-
mng 44 varieties of poisonous fish to be found in the islands. See also statement by Admiral
Strauss in N.Y. Times, April 1, 1954, p. 17, col. 1, to the effect that all fish caught in the
Bikini area are inedible at some seasons of the year due to the prevalence in the water tf
certain poisonous micro-organisms on which they feed.
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miles), in effect for fifty-seven days, amounted to a fraction of the seven per
cent of Japanese tuna production attributable to the entire Bonin and Man-
dated Regions area (approximately 2.5 million square miles)1 99 Moreover,
since tuna are found throughout the North Pacific,200 it seems probable that
fishing could have been deflected to areas adjacent to the zone with little if
any loss in yield.
Plainly no existing prescriptions in the regime of the high seas are literally
applicable to the unique problem presented by the tests. The United States
claim bears no similarity whatever to those which, historically, "freedom of
the seas" was intended to combat.20 1 Others are not excluded from the area
affected in order to enable the United States to grant fishing monopolies to
its nationals or to pursue the commercial aggrandizement of the United States
in any way.202 It is apparent, also, that the claim of the United States offers
no serious interference with the policies of promoting commercial navigation
and fishing which underlie "freedom of the seas." Moreover, the claim does
not offend against the subordinate policies against international friction which
are involved in claims to exercise police powers on the high seas. No ships
are seized or condemned, nor is civil or criminal jurisdiction of any kind
asserted.
What is relevant, and can be applied without irrational extrapolation, to
this new problem from prior prescriptions in the regime of the high seas is
the test of reasonableness which underlies them all-the test by which the
decision-makers of the world community have consistently during modern
times decided between claims to navigation and fishing and all that great
variety of claims, recounted above, which may interfere with navigation and
fishing, and ranging, as we have seen, through all the labels of "territorial
sea," "contiguous zones," "piracy," "self-defense," "continental shelf," and so
on, even to "freedom of the seas" itself.20 3 Because of their support of this
199. U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, TIIE JAPANESE TUNA FislIEIuES 11 (Fishery Leaflet
297, 1948).
200. Allen, Fishery Geography of the North Pacific Ocean, 43 GEOGaI-UCAL Rtv.
558,561 (1953).
201. See notes 83-84 supra and accompanying text.
202. It may require explicit statement that Dr. Margolis' separate expositioni of "the
law of fisheries," Margolis, pp. 640-41, adds no new authoritative prescription or policy
to those elsewhere expounded under the headings of "freedom of the seas" and "pollution."
The different expositions refer to the same facts, the same legal technicalities, and the
same policies. Lack of homogeneity in argument should not be taken for multiplicity ini
relevant prescription.
The concept of "abuse of rights," in particular, is merely an impressive-appearing cir-
cumlocution, fancied in some circles, for unreasonable behavior.
203. Our emphasis is of course upon the reasonableness test which underlies specific
applications of the "freedom of the seas" principle. As has been seen, text at notes 172-77
supra, the right to use the seas for such space-consuming activities as trawling, dredging,
and conducting dangerous maneuvers and peacetime defensive activities, has always been
claimed under "freedom of the seas," at least where no civil or criminal jurisdiction to
enforce exclusion has been asserted. One might, however, derive a similar conclusion even
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test, all the decisions sustaining claims which interfere with navigation and
fishing, whether for contiguous or non-contiguous uses, may be regarded as
relevant authority for appraising the claim of the United States. The claim
of the United States must enjoy, of course, whatever contribution to reason-
ableness the factor of contiguity may make, -20 4 since the United States has
jurisdiction not only over the land areas within the warning zones, but also
over all land areas whatsoever for nearly a thousand miles.2° Beyond pro-
pinquity to controlled shores, the United States may, however, point to many
from dogmatic exposition of the principle. If "freedom of the seas" is an absolute, as
Margolis, p. 634, says it is, it may therefore reasonably be asked why the sea.s are
not as "free" for nuclear weapons tests conducted in the interests of survival of the West,
as they are for navigation and fishing.
204. It is worthy of note that contiguity has never been a particularly important fact. r
in claims to conduct dangerous maneuvers or exercises at sea, perhaps for the reasun that
non-contiguous warning areas are often less of an interference with internatinal navi-
gation and fishing than zones near the claimant nation's shores would be. For examples oi
totally non-contiguous warning zones, see U.S. Hydrographic Office, Notice to Mariners,
pt. 1, No. 1, para. 33 (Jan. 1, 1955). Prescriptions relating to piracy and self-defense,
similarly, have not depended on contiguity, but authorize unilateral action n the high seas
wherever and whenever it may be necessary. See notes 150-53 surpra.
The factor of propinquity, with respect to any type of claim, is hut a physical factor
important for its bearing upon the reasonableness of a particular claim. The test of reason-
ableness is not determined by this factor alone, or limited to contexts in which it is present.
In contexts where it is not present, other factors may perform a comparable function in
offering indices of reasonableness. Contiguity may be expected to lose much of the im-
portance which has been attributed to it as technology inexorably pushes national interests
outward, and demands uses of the seas yet unforeseen. For suggestion of possible future
developments, see S.MrTH & CHAPIN, THE SUN, THE SEA, AND Tomsonrow (1954).
A concept which already bridges whatever gap there may be between contiguous and
non-contiguous claims is the doctrine of "hot pursuit." This highly interesting dvctrine is
the product of interaction between the claims of nation-states to make effective their pro-
tective jurisdiction in marginal seas, and other states' demands for reasonable limitation
of such claims. See Dickinson, Jurisdiction at the Maritime Frontier, 40 HARv. L RE . 1,
21 (1926). "Hot pursuit" enables states to seize and condemn ships anywhere on the seas,
so long as the seizure is made in the course of an immediate and uninterrupted pursuit
which began in adjacent seas. See, generally, HIGGINS & COLO.iros, THE IN'TERNxrAiO:AL
LAw OF THE SEA 10-11 (2d ed., Colombos 1951) ; SMITH, THE LAW AN D CusSTO3e OF TnHE
SEA 55-56, 114 (2d ed. 1950) ; BRIGGs, THE LAW OF NA.Tc'Ns 348, 335-88 (2d ed. 1952).
205. The nearest land not under U.S. jurisdiction is Nauru, 750 miles south of Bildni,
a trust territory administered by Australia. See U.N. Doc. No. A/402 (1947).
Having full powers of government over the areas, the United States has, of course, for
all practical purposes the same powers over sea areas contiguous to Bikini and Eniwetok
that it would have over seas contiguous to its own continental shores. See HARvArw RE-
SEARcH DRAFT ON TER~rrORLAL WATERS 2S9 (1929) ; International Law Commission, Report,
U.N. GENERAL AsSE.MLY OFF. REc., 9th Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 15 (Doe. No. A/2693)
(1954) ; id., 8th Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 19 (Doc. No. A/2456) (1953). For app'roval of an
exercise of arrest and seizure powers by a mandatory state at a distance of 10D miles seaward
from the coast of the mandate, see Naim Molvan v. Attorney-Gencral fur Palestine, [ 19481
A.C. 351, 369; Note, 10 CAmr. L.J. 268 (1949) ; Note, 24 N.Y.U.L.Q. 439 (1949). For
further elaboration of the powers of the United States as Administering Authority of the
Territory of the Pacific Islands, see text at notes 245-05 infra.
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other factors as indices of the reasonableness of its claim, factors comparable
to those which prior decision-makers have invoked to sustain so great a varie-
ty of claims to non-contiguous uses. The factors most relevant for apprais-
ing the United States claim are that it is for a purpose much honored in
world prescription, that it asserts the least possible degree of authority neces-
sary to the achievement of its purpose, that it is limited both in area and in
duration to the minimum consistent with its purpose, that the area which it
affects is of relatively slight importance to international trade and fishing,
and that it is asserted in a context of crisis which makes its purpose of para-
mount importance to all who value a free world society.
The claim of the United States is in substance a claim to prepare for self-
defense. It is not, as commonly in self-defense, a claim to respond with force
to an attack; it is no claim to invade territory or to sink fleets in anticipation
of attack or to take any of the other measures of drastic interference with
others commonly subsumed under self-defense. It is, however, a claim to
take certain preparatory measures under conditions comparable to those tradi-
tionally held to justify measures in self-defense. It is a claim to take certain
actions in contiguous zones and upon the high seas, with the minimum pos-
sible interference with others, under conditions of high necessity. The con-
ditions of this grave necessity and the absence of reasonable alternatives are
familiar knowledge. The contemporary development of instruments of de-
struction makes it possible for a war-bent nation-state utterly to destroy an
opponent and perhaps much of the world. It has not been possible to estab-
lish, under the United Nations, commitments and procedures of global scope
which offer reasonable assurance against aggression. As expectations of im-
minent violence in the world arena have become ever more realistic and
intense, many of the nations of the free world have organized themselves,
under appropriate provisions of the U.N. Charter, into regional groupings
for their more effective self-defense. 20 6 The United States has undertaken its
program of atomic and thermonuclear weapons development to ensure that
these coalitions of free nations are not lacking in the retaliatory power which
may deter aggression, or in the weapons of self-defense if deterrence fails.-"
Even prior to the bipolarizatioh of the world and the development of
nuclear weapons, it was generally agreed that a nation-state could, under the
necessities of self-defense, take the most drastic measures in interference with
what would otherwise have been the rights of others. Some of the historic
examples of the exercise of this right of self-defense have been recounted
above and others may be found in all the texts. So fundamental is the
206. U.N. CHARTER arts. 51, 52, ff 1. See, generally, 20rPENltxI-Laur},lu',t nT §
52aa; recent authorities cited note 145 supra.
207. The tests have in addition a purely defensive utility, wholly apart from deterrence
and retaliation. Those who are inclined to doubt this defensive utility of the tests
may with profit attempt to estimate the number of lives which would be saved, in the
event of an attack upon the United States or another western nation, by knwledge of the
magnitude and character of radioactive fallout gained in the tests of 1954, now being dis.seuni
nated by civil defense organizations.
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underlying policy, in a world without adequate centralized authority for the
maintenance of public order, that an express exception for self-defense is an
integral part of the prohibition of violence which appears in the United
Nations Charter.208 Exercised in the first instance by the nation-state whose
existence is threatened, but subjected also to review for reasonableness by
external decision-makers, this right is no nullification of world order but one
of the few remaining instruments by which world order may be sought.03-
If, therefore, the present legal organization of the world and posture of world
affairs put so high a premium upon self-defense, with authorization of poten-
tially the most drastic interferences with others, it cannot, we believe, be
reasonably concluded that it is unreasonable for the United States to engage
in temporary and limited interferences with navigation and fishing upon the
high seas in preparation for defense of itself, its allies, and all the values which
they cherish.
The attack upon the legality of the United States claim to conduct the
Pacific tests is made, perhaps it should be added, under the beneficent assump-
tion that the claim is made "in time of peace."210  It is, however, no longer
original to suggest that "peace" is scarcely an accurate description of the con-
temporary relation between the free and the totalitarian worlds. Indeed, as
expectations of violence continue to increase, and as the world approaches
perilously near the polar extreme of war, the literature of international law
reflects increasing dissatisfaction with the traditional war-peace dichotomy,
and its unrealistic, mutually exclusive world prescriptions.211 While there has
been little overt recognition, in the formulation of prescriptions, of the erosion
208. U.N. C0_aR art. 51.
209. The indispensable complementarity in world prescription of concepts of unlav, ful
violence, such as "aggression," and of self-defense sometimes escapes commentators. See,
for discussion, PompA AcRSSVE s aWAR 55 (1953) ; STONE, LEGAL CONROLS OF INT INA-
TIONAL CoNmi cr242, 330 (1954).
It must be either obscurity with respect to this fundamental characteristic of legal pre-
scription or else peculiar French reaction to historic, inordinate German demands that e--
plains Gidel's surprising reservations, in his otherwise brilliant study, concerning the role
of "self-defense" in authorizing claims to control upon the high seas. See, Gidel, Mem2to-
randum S. The external decision-makers who pass upon the reasonableness of claims need
yield no more to arbitrary and dogmatic absolutism in the name of "self-defense" than in
the name of unlawful violence. The one concept is as amenable to rational application as is
the other. It surpasses understanding, furthermore, why self-defense should be regarded
as so important in the "territorial sea" and suddenly cease to be important upon the pass-
ng of some imaginary line in the water.
210. .lf argolis, p. 635.
211. The most cited studies are GROB, THE RELATIVITY Or NI,%R aND P& - (1949),
and Eagleton, The Attempt to Defie War, IN-TL CoNlIdATIo:N No. -91 (1933). See also
SToNE, LEGAL COxTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLI.T 312 (1954) ; I WRGuT, A STDY o:F
WAR 10 (1942) ; Borchard, Var and Peace, 27 Am. J. IN'L, L 114 (1933) ; Jessup, Should
International Law Recognize an Intermediate Status Between Peace and H arr, 4S id. 93
(1954) ; Jessup, Intermediacy, 23 NoRnisx TwssmFrr Foa INTRMNATiONALE R-r 16
(1953) ; McNair, The Legal Meaning of War and the Relation of War to Reprisals, 11
Tnazs. GRottus Soc'- 29 (1926) ; Ronan, English and American Courts and the Definition
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of this misleading dichotomy, the more flexible areas of customary law have
long since responded to the nuances of change in factual context. In the
determinations of reasonableness which are necessary throughout the law of
the sea, decision-makers have simply accorded progressively greater defer-
ence to the need of individual states to take unilateral measures for their
security. 212 A similar realism might be invoked to reenforce the conclusion
that the claim of the United States to conduct hydrogen bomb tests is, under
contemporary conditions, a reasonable assertion which contravenes no pre-
scription or policy of the international law of the sea.213
It is obviously not necessary, in order to establish the lawfulness of the hydro-
gen bomb tests, to establish the further lawfulness of the use of such bombs
against any enemy urder all conceivable circumstances in any possible future
war. Since, however, various broad assertions have been made that any use
of such bombs would or might be illegal under the law of war,21 4 a few con-
siderations may be noted.
It would, in the first place and most relevantly, seem clear that any prior
use of such weapons by an enemy would immediately authorize the United
States to use the same weapons in reprisal. 21r The whole purpose of the law
of reprisal in relation to the prohibitions of the law of war, like that of self-
defense in relation to aggression, is to permit the use of what would other-
wise be lawless violence as a sanction against lawless violence. 210
of War, 31 Aa!. J. INTL L. 642 (1937) ; Schwarzenberger, is Pacis ac Belli, 37 id. 460
(1943); Tucker, The Interpretation of IVar under Present International Law, 4 INT'L
L.Q. 11 (1951). For the mode of analysis we recommend, see McDougal, Peace and War:
Factual Continuum with Multiple Legal Consequences, 49 Amx. J. INT'L L. 63 (1955).
212. See text at notes 145-91 supra.
213. It is perhaps worth mentioning that the neat "legal" dilemma, set up in Margolis,
p. 636, that "the greater the degree of precaution" the United States takes to warn
people out of the danger zones, "the greater the interference with freedom of navigation
on the high seas," assumes his answer to the very question in issue: that the warning zones
established by the United States are unlawful. In popular parlance this is known as levita-
tion by one's own bootstraps.
214. See Margolis, p. 639 n.59, and authorities cited. See also The Present State of
International Law, Address by W. Harvey Moore, International Law Association, Edin-
burgh Conference, 1954, p. 9; SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND WAR RxGHTs 274 (3d ed. 1947) ;
Sack, A.B.C.-Atomic, Biological, Chemical Warfare in International Law, 10 LAW. GULDP
REv. 161 (1950). Discussion of pros and cons with references is offered in SToNE, LEGAL
CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 342 (1954) and 2 OPPENHEIM-LAUTERP'ACUT 347-
352.
215. Id.at351.
216. Albrecht, War Reprisals in the War Crimes Trials and in the Geneva Conven-
tions of 1949,47 Ams. J. INT'L L. 590 (1953).
Suggestions occasionally found in the literature that the doctrine of reprisals is a
negation, rather than a sanction of law reflect again a lack of understanding both of the
complementarity of prescription in the whole law of war and of the indispensability of self-
help sanctions in a decentralized world order. McDougal, supra note 211, passinm.
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It would, in the second place and with scarcely less relevance, appear most
difficult for a contemporary decision-maker to achieve a complete prohibition
against the prior use of such weapons by generalization from prescriptions
created with respect to very different weapons in a very different world.
There is no express prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons in either cus-
tomary or conventional international law, and the argument for prohibition
is derived by "analogy" from prescriptions with respect to poisonous gas and
arms and other weapons causing disproportionate suffering.21 7 In interna-
tional as in municipal law, however, analogies in prescription and decision are
relevant only for the policies which infuse them.
The fundamental policy which underlies the various analogies invoked wNith
respect to nuclear weapons, as well as the prohibitions with respect to all other
weapons and indeed the law of war generally, is the minimum destruction of
values-that is, the balancing of "military necessity" for "legitimate objec-
tives" against "humanitarianism" and the disproportionate or irrelevant de-
struction of values.2 1 8 The Achilles heel in this policy is, in common knowl-
edge, that the decision-makers of the world community have never been able
to become very precise about the "legitimate objectives" of violence or, hence,
about the degree of destruction permissible under "military necessity" ;210 and in
the contemporary bipolar world, with totalitarians and proponents of the dig-
nity of man confronting each other in mortal struggle, agreement upon these
fundamentals seems less likely than ever. It is not necessarily a mark of
moral superiority, but perhaps rather of suicidal arrogance, to suggest that no
possible uses of the hydrogen bomb could conceivably be within the scope of
"military necessity" for objectives legitimate by standards of respect for
human dignity. 20 It would appear the most rational course to withhold
217. For citations see note 214 stpra.
218. In making this generalization and in this whole analysis of the lawfulness of pis-
sible use of the hydrogen bomb, we draw upon FELICxo, LE.AL RFGLR5L ot: oF Ta:xs-
NATIONAL CoERcIoN: STUDIES IN THE LAW OF WATR (unpublished thesis in Yale Law
Library 1954).
The fundamental policy is easily identifiable in the decisions and literature of the law
of war. See Phillips, Air WVarfare and the Lau, 21 Geo. W.%sii. L. R '. 311, 395 (1953) ;
Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Rczision of the Law of l'ar, 29 BRIT. Y.B. I:NT' L 3 0
(1952) ; Baxter, The Role of Lawin M 1odctrn War, 47 P: oc. A'i. Str:y INTL L 90 (1953) ;
Kunz, The Chaotic Staits of the Laws of l'ar and the Urgient Necessity for their Rezision,
45 Am. J. INT'L L. 37 (1951).
219. The basic conflict about "legitimate objectives" of violence is well illustrated in
the continuing debate about the definition of aggression. See Poiiwr, AGGoESslva 1%,,n %-.
INTER%,ATIO--AL CRXImE 39 et seq. (1953) ; STONE, sul, ra note 214, at 330; International
Law Commission, Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Definingj .419iression,
U.N. GENERAL ASSEMELY OFF. R Ec., 9th Sess., Supp. No. 11 (Duc. No. A/2638) (1954).
The vagaries that ensue with respect to "military necessity" may be sampled in 3 Dun-
bar, Military Necessi!y in War Crimes Trials, 29 BrUT. Y.B. I:zT'L L 442 (1952) ; Downey,
The Law of IVar and Military Necessity, 47 Ai.,. J. INA'L L. 251 (1953); 1 SioNs, supra
note 214, at 337.
220. Note the careful outlining of relevant considerations in Stimson, The Decision
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blanket judgment and to appraise each specific use of nuclear weapons, as
most other weapons and destructive practices are appraised, in the total con-
text of such specific use.
It is not the particular physical modality of destruction that is relevant to
law and policy but rather the purposes and the effects of the destruction and
the relation of these purposes and effects to the values of a free world socie-
ty.221 Certainly proponents of the dignity of man cannot rationally expect,
by writing self-inhibiting meanings into the concepts of "military necessity,"
"legitimate objectives," and "humanitarianism," either to preclude totali-
tarians from writing in different meanings, or to deter them from raining
destruction from the skies.
THE BALANCING OF SECURITY AND POLLUTION IN DETERMINING
REASONABLENESS
The argument against the tests based on "pollution" 222 introduces no prin-
ciple or policy not already considered in connection with the law of the sea
in general: it merely focuses attention upon one modality of possible inter-
ference with the competing uses of navigation and fishing. No international
tribunal has ever held a nation-state liable in damages for pollution of the sea,
or declared the existence of a duty to desist.22 3 The international regulation
of pollution is at its merest inception, with prescriptions yet to be formu-
lated.224 In this state of affairs, a decision-maker confronted with competing
claims with respect to pollution and freedom of navigation and fishing can
only resort to such sources as "general principles of law recognized by civil-
to itse the Atomic Bomb, 194 HARPEnS MAG. 97 (1947). See also Stowell, The Lais o
War and the Atomic Bomb, 39 Am. J. INT'L L. 784 (1945) ; Borchard, The Atomic Bomb,
40 Am. J. INr'L L. 161 (1946).
221. Phillips, supra note 218, passim; Spaak, The Atom Bomb and NATO, 33 ,'OaxIoN
AFFAIRS 353 (1955). Contrast the attitudes expressed by Phillips and Spaak with the uIn-
realistic attitude in SPAIGHT, op. cit. supra note 214, at 274, approving area saturation
bombing with its total destruction, yet concluding that atomic weapons are unlawful.
222. Margolis, pp. 641-43.
223. See the Trail Smelter Case, Award of April 16, 1938, and March 11, 1941, 3 U.N.
REP. INT'L ARBITRAL AWARDS 1905, 1963; 1 GIDEL, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC DE LA
MER 480-84 (1932). See, however, the carefully limited statement in I HYDE, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 757-58 (2d ed. 1945).
224. The extremely limited degree of international agreement on restriction of sea
pollution is indicated by the Convention drafted and opened for signature at the Inter-
national Conference on Pollution of the Sea held in London during April and May 1954.
Article II exempts naval auxiliaries, ships under 500 tons gross tonnage, ships in the whal-
ing industry, and ships proceeding to ports not equipped with facilities for disposal of oil
waste, from the obligation to refrain from discharging noxious substances in the restricted
zones created by the Convention. Art IV exempts discharges to secure the safety of the ship,
discharges resulting from damage or unavoidable leakage, and discharges of sediment not
susceptible of being pumped or resulting from certain processes, "provided that such dis,-
charge is made as far from land as is practicable." Article III restricts enforcement of
the Convention to the state of registration. International Convention for the Prohibition
of Pollution of the Sea by Oil (mimeo unchecked copy 1954) (on file in Yale Law Library).
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ized nations," and considerations "ex acquo et bono."225 The decision-maker
thus resorting to national prescriptions with respect to "nuisance" generally,
and the pollution of waters in particular, finds himself, despite an elaborate
faqade of technical terms, instructed only to apply the familiar and indispens-
able test of reasonablenessY0° The innumerable forms which such controver-
sies may indeed take makes it impracticable to adopt any standard more e.-
plicit than that of reasonableness, determined by the familiar process of bal-
ancing the "utility of the conduct" causing damage, and the "gravity of the
harm" to the injured party2 7 In applying municipal law to controversies
between nation-states, there is, however, one new and most significant factor
which must be taken into account in determining reasonableness, and that is
the factor of security. Any balancing of interests which failed to take account
of the demands for security which states must make in the contemporary
world would, of course, be most unrealistic.
The attack upon the legality of the tests attempted by Dr. Margolis is, thus,
not only couched in terms of an inadequate formulation of doctrine, but de-
pends ultimately upon analogies which are fantastically inapt in both fact and
policy. By focusing upon "serious magnitude" of damage as the sole legal
test,-5 he neglects to consider the most important element in the problem:
the overriding utility of the tests to the free world. This one-sided method of
calculation is, of course, not to be found in the very cases he cites. = The
principal case relied upon, the Trail Smelter 2o arbitration, is indeed a pass-
225. STAT. IIT'L CT. JrsT. art. 38, ITI 1(c), 2.
226. For extensive citation of authorities in American law, see McDoucAL & HAUMa
P.oPEmTY, VAuLTH, LAND 43941 (1948). See also 1 OPPENHEIM-LAUTrPACUT 313 n.6;
Gutteridge, Abuse of Rights, 5 C~Aa. UJ. 22 (1932) ; Winfield, Aruisance as a Tort, 4
CAmB. L.J. 189 (1932) ; Haab, Das Sachenrccht, in 4 KOMMENTAR zUin SCHwVzExMscHnE
ZVILGEsTzBucH, pt. 1, at 442-47 (2d ed. 1935); NVARr mm, DAs BCncsacnE GrsMrz-
BucH 604-07 (7th ed. 1938).
227. RE.STATEmENT, ToRTS §§ 827, 828 (1939). For explicit recognition of the "rela-
tivity" of the rule for determining what constitutes "an injurious act," in the only inter-
national proceeding ever to consider the liability of a nation-state for air pollution, see the
Trail Smelter Case, Award of April 16, 1938 and March 11, 1941, 3 U.N. RLv. ITfL'h
ARBiTRA AwARns 1905, 1963, citing the very relevant case of Aargau v. Solothurn,
41 ENzTSCHEIDUXGEX DES ScHwEizEscHEx BUNDESGEIMCHTES pt. 1, at 126, 137 (1915)
(impossibility of preventing all conceivable danger should not prevent pursuance of a
necessary or desirable activity). See also notes 231,241 infra.
228. Mlargolis, p._642.
229. See New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473, 480-83 (1931) ; New York
v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 314 (1921), cited by Margolis, p. 642 n.67. The Court
did not find it necessary to balance the "magnitude of the harm" and the "utility of
the conduct" in Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906), because it found that no
harm whatever had been proved. Id. at 526. It did, however, emphasize that unless the
case was "of serious magnitude, clearly and fully proved," it would not intervene at all.
Id. at 521. Dr. Margolis has, thus, taken the maxim do minimis non curat lex for the
whole law of nuisance. For a discussion of the balancing prucess in the Trail Smelter
Case, see note 231 in!ra.
230. Award of April 16, 1938 and M1arch 11, 1941, 3 U.N. REP. IN;r's ArxlDrOL
AwAs 1905.
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able illustration of the balancing process upon which the law of nuisance de-
pends.2 3 ' But the fact that a copper company in British Columbia was re-
quired to take measures available to it to minimize damage to a downwind
agricultural community, scarcely reflects policies relevant for appraising the
reasonableness of measures taken in mid-ocean by a nation-state faced with
imminent threats of atomic attack. Similarly, cases in which the United States
Supreme Court settles internal disputes between member-states of the union
are relevant only for their emphasis upon the underlying policy of reason-
ableness. 232 Such internal disputes do not raise the issues of external security,
since under our federal system it is the national government which is charged
with responsibility for security and most other problems relating to the
high seas.
23 3
The facts available as to the extent to which water and fish were made
radioactive by the tests, and in what areas, leave much to be desired. News-
paper reports originating with segments of the Japanese press unfriendly to
the United States, for various reasons, exaggerated the effects of the tests with
"evident malice," 234 and no complete, authoritative reports are yet available.
It is not clear whether fish found to be dangerously radioactive were caught
within or without the largest warning zone, established after the effects of the
March 1st test became apparent, 235 so that it is not possible to say whether
231. In the Trail Smelter Case, Award of April 16, 1938 and March 11, 1941, 3 U.N.
REP. IN'r'L ARBITRAL AWARDS 1905, the arbitrators recognized the necessity of welfghhv,
all the circumstances when they" defined "an injurious act," in effect, as an nnreasonab~ly
injurious act. Id. at 1963. The decree permitted the smelter to continue in operation mid
to emit sulphur dioxide fumes in an amount presumably deemed reasonable. Id. at 1974
et seq. Trail Smelter is characterized as a "passable" illustration because it involved a
balancing process on one level only. The tribunal did not clearly distinguish the separate
questions whether damages could be recovered, and whether injunctive relief could be
obtained. See notes 240-41 infra.
232. See cases cited note 299 supra; Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 60 (1931).
The arbitrators in the Trail Smelter Case, Award of April 16, 1938 and March 11, 1941,
3 U.N. REP. INT'L ARBITRAL AWARDS 1905, 1964, stated that such decisions are relevant
where "no reason for rejecting such precedents can be adduced from the limitations of
sovereignty inherent in the Constitution of the United States." (Emphasis added.)
233. See United States v. California, 223 U.S. 19, 34-36 (1947). Even in the absence
of an external security problem, the Supreme Court has often emphasized itt. unwilling-
ness to enjoin action undertaken by a "quasi-sovereign" state. See, e.g., New York v. New
Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921) ; Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 521 (1906).
234. Arnold, Effects of the Recent Bomb Tests on Human Beings, 10 But.. ATor.I.
SCIENTISTS 347, 348 (1954).
235. Margolis, p. 638, asserts that radioactive fish were caught outside the March-
May 1954 warning zone. These allegations are supported by a wire-service report,
reprinted in the N.Y. Times, which quotes Professor Takajiro Mori of Tokyo University
to the effect that radioactive fish were being caught "off Formosa" and "off Japan." In
a somewhat inconclusive letter to the authors, Professor Mori suggests that by "off" Japan
and Formosa he meant "about 450 miles from Bikini," which would be some 1500 miles from
Japan and 2100 miles from Formosa, on the edge of the March-May warning area (450
miles in radius). Letter from Professor Takajiro Mori, Fisheries Dept., Faculty of Agri-
culture, Tokyo University, Hongo, Tokyo, Japan, to the Yale Law Journal, March 4,
[Vol. 04:648
1955] HYDROGEN BOMB TESTS IN PERSPECTIVE 693
safety measures in addition to the establishment of an adequate warning zone
would be necessary if and when future tests are conducted. It seems clear that
no injuries whatever resulted from consumption or handling of fish rendered
radioactive by the tests, or from radioactive sea water.20 The safety measures
taken by the Japanese Government were understandably drastic, resulting in
1955, on file in Yale Law Library. The AEC has consistently maintained that no danger
from radioactive fish exists outside the test area. AEC Semi-Anuual Report, excerpted in
N.Y. Times, July 31, 1954, p. 1, col. 3. See also N.Y. Times, April 1, 1954, p. 20, col. 5.
No responsible source has yet made an unqualified assertion that any fish caught were
dangerous to human beings. See Arnold, supra note 234, at 347-48; Japan Information
Bull. No. 4, pp. 6-7 (Information Section, Embassy of Japan, Sept. -9, 1954). Arnold
states that radioactivity in fish tends to concentrate in the liver, kidney, and other special
organs, leaving the meat normally consumed relatively free of activity, "even in the most
highly contaminated specimens . . . ." He concludes that "it seems likely . . . that...
the tolerance level was set too low. It is unfortunate that 'normal' catches were not
available for comparison." Arnold, supra note 234, at 348. Arnold's account of the facts
suggests that (perhaps excepting condemnation of the fish in the open hold of the Fuhuryu
Maru), the safety measures taken by the Japanese Government were valuable largely as an
antidote to popular alarm. No difficulty with radioactive fish was experienced anyw.,here in
the Territory of the Pacific Islands, although fishing %was not restricted except in the im-
mediate test area. See Communication from Deputy High Commissioner, Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands, to the Yale Law Journal, Feb. 25, 1955, on file in Yale Law Library.
Although the "fairly indisputable facts" alleged by Margolis, pp. 637-39, seem dubious
in the extreme, we assume, for purposes of the judgments made in the text above, that
safety would require monitoring of deep-sea catches from a broad area in the North Pacific
for a period of time following a test series.
For a compendious collection of the more fantastic press reports which have appeared con-
cerning not only radioactive fish but miscellaneous meteorological and other alleged effects
of the tests, see Laurents, Experiment in Annihilation, 5 CoNawr-l,. IssUES 214 (1954).
236. See Japan Information Bull. No. 4, supra note 235, at 6-7, reporting on the test
damage, and listing no casualties except the crew of the Fuhur3yn Mai. Compare Mar-
golis, p. 637, citing a third-hand wire service report to the effect that five crew-members
of a Japanese freighter which passed within 1200 miles of the tests "were reported suffer-
ing from radiation sickness" and that doctors "were quoted as saying the five men were
'gradually recovering." N.Y. Times, June 5, 1954, p. 2, col 6. The AEC has asserted
that radioactivity borne on ocean currents would disperse to a point at which it would be
"undetectable" within 500 miles or less. N.Y. Times, April 1, 1954, p. 20, col. 6.
Dr. A.H. Sturtevant, geneticist at the California Institute of Technology, cited by
Margolis, p. 639 n.58, two weeks after his ominous speculations were excerpted in the N.Y.
Times, wrote to caution that the danger at present fallout rates was very small, and that
he did not think people should be unduly anxious about the problem. N.Y. Times, Jan.
30, 1955, § 4, p. 9, col. S. The AEC later announced that the total amount of radiation
from "all nuclear detonations to date," has amounted to the equivalent of one chest x-ray
per person. Statement by Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman, USAEC Press Release, Feb. 15,
1955, p. 4. Amounts of radiation larger than this by some hundreds of times are habitually
used by physicians and dentists for diagnostic purposes, and are, of course, considered
negligible. See generally Ritter, et al, Roentgent Doses during Diagnostic Procedures, 59
RADioLOGy 238 (1952). For the conclusion, buttressed by substantial data and detailed
calculations, that the long-range radiation effects of tests are "minute!' and "of a low order"
in comparison with the natural background radiation in the earth and atmosphere, see
Eisenbud & Harley, Radioactive Dust fron Nuclear Detonations, 117 Scm..cz 141, 147
(1953).
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the condemnation of some 176 tons of fish, but were 100 per cent effective. 2 7
Domestic tuna prices in Japan plummeted to 50 per cent of normal in April
1954, after sensationalized accounts of the test effects were published, but ex-
ports were unaffected.238 In view of all the facts now known, any serious
attempt to balance the stake of the free world in the tests against the damage
resulting from pollution-damage which has taken the exclusive form of
financial damage for which compensation has been paid-must reach, we sub-
mit, the conclusion that the tests are reasonable and hence lawful.2
30
It might of course be concluded, by analogy from municipal law, that al-
though under all criteria of reasonableness a nation-state is entitled to
conduct such tests under contemporary conditions, it should still be held
responsible in damages for any inevitable injuries to innocent parties. In
every mature legal system the balancing process which determines whether
liability exists is repeated in answering the entirely separate question whether
the liability-creating conduct may be continued.240 No international tribunal
has yet unequivocally faced the issue whether a state may continue to
carry on conduct for which it is liable in damages, 241 but sound policy
237. Japan Information Bull. No. 4, pp. 6-7 (Information Section, Embassy of Japan,
Sept. 29, 1954).
238. Ibid. Compare Margolis, p. 638, asserting that exports "became increasingly
difficult."
239. Since the attack on the tests was couched in terms of "justice and equity," we
have preferred to meet it directly and on the merits. It may appropriately be noted, how-
ever, that other obstacles to recovery would have to be surmounted before the question
of reasonableness could even be reached. Thus, the most advanced statements of publicists
supporting international liability for sea pollution, e.g., 1 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 757-58
(2d ed. 1945), have referred to damage suffered by a state or its nationals within territorial
waters, where states have acknowledged property rights. Similarly, liability for nuisance
in private law is assessed for infringement of property rights. In the present state of world
prescription about fisheries, it might at least be questioned whether states have property
rights of sufficient degree in fish swimming in the high seas to be entitled to damages for
injury to them. See note 224 supra. Cf. however, the references to "rights" and "interests"
of states in high seas fisheries in connection with claims to contiguous zones for fishery
conservation, discussed in text at notes 120-24 supra.
The captious might wonder, again, if "freedom of the seas" is an absolute, why such
absolutism does not include the freedom to pollute. See Margolis, p, 634.
240. For citation of authorities in American law, see McDOUGAL & HAIER, PRoPRT.',
WEALTH, LAND 439-41 (1948). See also HANBURY, MODFRN EQUITY 625 (6th ed. 1952)
SNELL, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 593-94 (22d ed., Rivington 1939); 65 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN
DES SC11WEIZMUSCIEN BUNDESGERICHTES pt. 2, at 157 (1940) ; 40 id., pt. 2, at 445, 450
(1915) (interpreting § 684, Swiss Civil Code). The same legal result is achieved in some
civil lav countries by administrative process. See Loi de 19 decembre, 1917, [1919] DALLOZ
PgRIbDIQUE pt. 4, at 10 et seq., as amended, Loi de 20 avril, 1932, [1932] id. pt. 4, at 161,
Loi de 2 fevrier, 1942, [1942] DALLoz ANALYTIQUE 66; GABOLDE, MANUEL JURDIQLUR I't
]LTABLISSEMENTS DANGEREUX, INCOMMODES ET INSALUDRES (1951) ; BORGERLIcnEs GESETZ-
BUCH § 906 (4th ed., Hoeniger 1927); 3 STAUDINGER, KOMMENTAR ZUMt BO aEiuacnEs
GESETZBUCH 308-26 (9th ed., Kober 1912); GEWERBEORDNUNG, § 26 (5th ed., Neukamp
1901) ; STiER-SoMLO, KOMMENTAR ZUR GEWERBEORDNUNG 82-83 (2d ed. 1923).
241. Cf. Trail Smelter Case, Award of April 16, 1938 and March 11, 1941, 3 U.N.
RE'. INT'L ARBITRAL AWARDS 1905, 1963, in which the tribunal avoided answering this
6
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decrees that international law should parallel municipal law in this respect 2 42
Although no legal issues were formally resolved between Japan and the United
States, the settlement in fact reached a desirable legal result. Japan explicitly
refused to demand that the United States discontinue its tests,243 and the
United States paid two million dollars in damages "without reference" to
questions of legal liability.2-4 Only third parties, unembarrassed by responsi-
bilities for the defense and security of the free world, seem unable to per-
ceive the need for an appropriate discrimination between remedy for damage
and mutual tolerance for vital interests.
THE EXPECTATIONS WITH RESPECT TO SECURITY CREATED BY THE
CHARTER AND TRUSTEESHIP AGREEMENT
After wresting the islands of the Pacific from Japan at an immense cost in
blood and treasure, the people of the United States were determined that
these strategically important islands should never again be allowed to fall into
the hands of an aggressor nation or to jeopardize the security of the United
States in any way. An influential segment of public opinion favored annex-
ation of the islands as the only satisfactory solution, but the American anti-
colonial tradition made annexation repugnant to many.2 45 The trusteeship
provisions of the United Nations Charter, proposed in large part by the
United States with the Pacific islands in mind 2 40 reflect a compromise be-
tveen these demands for annexation and our antipathy to colonialism. The
question squarely by referring to the clause of its comproinis which emphasized the desire
of the parties to reach a final solution of the controversy. The United States in Trail
Smelter argued that a state may not continue activity which inflicts legally compen-able
"injury," id. at 1962-63, an attitude which may be responsible for its desire to settle with
Japan "without reference" to questions of legal liability. See text at note 244 inf ra.
242. See Comment, 37 YALE L.J. 96 (1927), clarifying policies embodied in municipal
law, which are rather obviously applicable in the contemporary world arena.
243. Foreign Minister Katsuo Okazaki to the Japanese Diet, reported in N.Y. Times,
April 2, 1954, p. 4, col. 6. Mr. Okazaki stated that Japan could not possibly ask the
United States to discontinue thermonuclear tests unless the Soviet Union stopped also,
and that it would cooperate with the United States in its testing activities in the belief that
the tests "will contribute to world peace." Manchester Guardian, March 24, 1954, p. 1,
col. 2. For refusals by other governments to ask that the tests be halted, see N.Y. Times',
April 6, 1954, p. 12, cols. 3, 5 (U.K.), April 7, 1954, p. 3, col. 1 (Canada) : N.Y. Herald
Tribune, April 10, 1954, p. 2, col. 7 (Australia) ; French and Belgian representatives in
Standing Committee on Petitions, U.N. Trusteeship Council, Summnary Record (Doc. No.
T/C.2/SR-198) (1954); New Zealand, Republic of China, Haiti, and El Salvadur in U.N.
TRusTEEsiaP Couxcn. OFF. Rac., 14th Sess., 561st meeting 246-48 (1954).
244. N.Y. Times, Jan. 5,1955, p. 6, col. 1.
245. For review of the annexation controversy, and identificatiun of public figures
supporting the various points of view, see McKay, International Trusteeship-Rule 01
United Nations in the Colonial IWorld, 22 FOREIGN PoLIcY R.r-ors 54, 63-65 (1946);
SoN, WoRLD LAw 638 (1950).
246. McKay, siupra note 245, at 57-58. See also Hcarinks before the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations on the Charter of the United Nations for the laintenauce of Inter-
national Peace and Securi3,, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 112-18 (1945).
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system of administration ultimately established in the Pacific islands similar-
ly expresses both the demand of the United States for the utmost freedom of
action in matters relating to the security of itself and the world, and its con-
comitant willingness to assume a duty to promote the welfare of the islands'
indigenous inhabitants.
The provisions of the Charter relating to dependent areas and trusteeship
areas incorporate and implement both these complementary goals of security
and humanitarianism. 247 The framers of the Charter discarded as unrealistic
the non-fortification provisions of the League Covenant, which forbade forti-
fication or other military use of "B" and "C" mandates,248 and substituted
the policy expressed in Article 76, that the first of the basic objectives of the
trusteeship system should be "to further international peace and security."
Article 84 specifically obligates each administering authority to ensure that the
trust territory shall "play its part" in the maintenance of international peace
and security, and empowers the administering authority to make use of volun-
teer forces, facilities, and assistance from the trust territory. This fundamental
shift from League policy is further emphasized by the fact that the word
"security" appears no less than three times in Article 73, which declares the
obligations of member-states with respect to non-self-governing territories
generally.
249
At the instance of the United States, moreover, a new institution, the
"strategic" trusteeship, was created by Article 82 of the Charter. This in-
stitution was proposed by the United States with a view to creating an appro-
priate regime for the Pacific islands, 250 and they are, indeed, the only territory
247. "The chapters of the Charter relating to dependent territories and trusteeship
create the machinery to accomplish these purposes [raising the standards of colonial ad-
ministration, etc.] and at the same time to make it possible fully to protect the vital security
interests of the United States with respect to any territories in the Pacific and elsewhere
which, by later agreement, may be included in the trusteeship system." Hearings, supra
note 246, at 113. See also GOODRICH & HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 452-54
(1949) ; Gross, United Nations Trusteeship and League of Nations Mandate Systems, 4
INDIA QUARTERLY 224 (1948).
248. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, paras. 5, 6. See BENTWiCH V. MARTIN,
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 156-57 (1950) ; HALL, MANDATES, DEPENDENCIES AND
TRusrsHIPs 279-80 (1948).
249. Cf. KELSEN, LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 557-58, 559 (1950) : "But it is signifi-
cant that in an Article the main purpose of which seems to be to provide for protection of
non-self-governing peoples, the promotion of international peace and security which may
impair this protection, is referred to twice." Professor Kelsen also notes that the imple-
menting section of the article is made subject to "such limitation as [national] security
and constitutional considerations may require." Id. at 561.
The preeminence of security in the trusteeship provisions of the Charter is of course
a reflection of the fact that the principal purpose of the Charter as a whole is the inainte-
nance of international peace and security. For elaboration of this major purpose of the
Charter, see McDougal & Gardner, The Veto and the Charter: An Interpretation for
Survival, 60 YALE L.J. 258 (1951) ; Gross, supra note 247, at 225, 238.
250. McKay, supra note 245, at 57; Hearings, mpra note 246 at 113, 116.
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to which it has ever been applied.251 All functions of the United Nations
relating to strategic trusteeship territories were, as was provided in Article
83, to be exercised by the Security Council, where any of the five permanent
members could veto any action which it believed might threaten its own in-
dividual security. 2 _ In the same Article, however, the basic objectives of the
trusteeship system set forth in Article 76, including those with respect to the
welfare and fundamental human rights of the inhabitants of an area, were
made applicable to "strategic" trusteeships, and the Security Council was
directed, "subject to the provisions of the trusteeship agreements and without
prejudice to security considerations," to avail itself of the assistance of the
Trusteeship Council to perform functions relating to political, social, and edu-
cational matters in strategic areas.
The principal constitutional document under which the United States
governs the Territory of the Pacific Islands is the Trusteeship Agreement for
the Former Japanese Mandated Islands,2-" effective July 18, 1947, in which
the Security Council "satisfied itself" that "the relevant articles of the Charter
have been complied with."-54 This fundamental charter of authority confers
upon the administering authority "full powers of administration, legislation
and jurisdiction" over the territory, and authorizes it to apply, "subject to any
modifications which the administering authority may consider desirable, such
of the laws of the United States as it may deem appropriate to local conditions
and requirements." 25: Article 5 of the agreement reemphasizes the departure
from the non-militarization regime of the League by conferring upon the ad-
ministering authority a power similar to the "war power" of the United States
Constitution, in terms limited only by denial of the power of conscription.
The United States is empowered:
"1. to establish naval, military and air bases and to erect fortifications
in the trust territory;
2. to station and employ armed forces in the territory; and
3. to make use of volunteer forces, facilities and assistance from the
trust territory .... 1256
251. GoODRIcH & HllaaRO, op. cit. supra note 247, at 453.
252. U.N. CHARAER art. 27, para. 3.
253. 61 STAT. 3301, T.I.A.S. No. 1665, 8 U.N. TnLaT" SEn. 1S9 (hereinafter cited as
TRUSTEESHIP AGREEMENT).
254. TRUSTE-HIP AGPEEENT, Preamble.
255. Id., art 3. For the suggestion that full powers of administratin, legislatiun, and
jurisdiction are indistinguishable from "sovereignty," for all practical purposes, see Vel.-
vato, Les Accords de Tvt'lle, 76 HAGUE RECUE1L 613, 655 (1950).
256. TRUSTEESHIP AGREMENT art. 5.
The Soviet Union early took the position that the utilization of trusteeship territories
for the support of "international peace and security" was only admissible where the ad-
ministering authority was acting pursuant to an agreement with the Security Council. This
view would of course subject all military activities in trusteeship territories tw the vet.v
powers of the five permanent members, including the Soviet Union. The Charter is, hkuw-
ever, consistent with some five different procedures for maintaining "internativnal peae
and security," only two of which are subject to prior control by the Security Council, ste
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The Agreement gives to the United States control over the foreign affairs
of the Territory,25 7 power to combine it with other territories under United
States jurisdiction for customs, fiscal, or administrative purposes,25 3 power to
discriminate in favor of the United States in economic matters despite the
equal treatment clause of the Charter,25 9 and power to bar all U.N. super-
vision in "areas which may from time to time be specified" by the United
States as "closed for security reasons.1260 The terms of the Agreement may
not be altered, amended, or terminated without the consent of the Administer-
ing Authority.
261
The comprehensive powers thus granted the Administering Authority are,
however, accompanied by certain parallel duties. The Charter itself, of course,
requires the administering authority to ensure the political, economic, social,
and educational advancement of the inhabitants, their just treatment, and their
protection against abuses, and to encourage respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion.262 All members of the United Nations agreed, further, to accept as
a "sacred trust" the obligation to promote to the utmost, "within the system
note 296 infra, so that the Soviet Union's proposed interpretation would have been an
unvarranted extension of its power to thwart defense preparations. The Soviet view was
rejected by the General Assembly and its Fourth Committee. See Goooac & HAntIro,
op. cit. supra note 247, at 458-59; Gross, United Nations Trusteeship and League of Nations
Mandate Systems, 4 INDIA QUARTERLY 224, 227-28 (1948).
In Committee 11/4 at the San Francisco Conference, the delegate from Egypt moved
to amend the Working Paper submitted by the United States (eventually Article 84 of the
Charter, from which the military powers of the United States as Administering Authority
derive) to provide that the administering authority "[may] . . .under the control of the
Security Council" utilize facilities and assistance from trusteeship territories. Doe. No.
580, 11/4/24, 10 U.N. CONF. INT'L ORG. Docs. 488 (1945). In support of the motion it was
said that without the amendment the power of the administering authority to make use of
facilities and assistance in trusteeship territories would "be absolute, a situation which
would be undesirable for the peoples of the territory." Ibid. The amendment was defeated
by 26 votes to 2. Ibid. See also Gross, supra, at 231: "the new approach is dominated by
considerations of national security to an extent and in a manner unknown to the Mandate
System . . . . The Trusteeship System appears to be founded on the idea of the para-
mountcy of the national security interests of the administering authority."
The limitation that only "volunteer" forces from trust territories be utilized by ad-
ministering authorities, U.N. CHARTER art. 84, was insisted upon by the United States.
United Nations Secretariat, The Question of Fortifications and Volunteer Forces iu Trust
Territories, U.N. Doc. No. A/C.4/40, at 3 (1946).
257. TRUSTEESHIP AGREEMENT arts. 8(4), 10.
258. Id., art. 9.
259. Id., art. 8(1).
260. Id., art. 13. The Security Council might, of course, investigate any dispute or
situation to determine whether its continuance "is likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security," under U.N. CHARTER arts. 34, 39, in the same manner and
to the same extent as in relation to any other part of the world.
261. TRUSTEESHIP AGREEMENT art. 15.
262. U.N. CHARTER arts. 73(a), 76(b), (c).
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of international peace and security established by the ... Charter, the well-
being of the inhabitants of these territories."'2'
In the Trusteeship Agreement, the United States voluntarily accepted
greater and more specific obligations than were required by the Charter, to
promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the
inhabitants. 2 6 Economic advancement was to be secured by regulating the
use of natural resources, encouraging the "development of fisheries, agricul-
ture and industries," protecting the inhabitants "against the loss of their lands
and resources," and improving "the means of transportation and communi-
cation."26 The administering authority was to promote the social advance-
ment of the inhabitants, and to this end to
"protect the health of the inhabitants; control the traffic in arms and
ammunition, opium and other dangerous drugs, and alcohol and other
spirituous beverages; and institute such other regulations as may be
necessary to protect the inhabitants against social abuses .... ,,-.GO
Other obligations relating to the political and educational advancement of the
inhabitants, and to civil rights, are similarly detailed.
2 G7
Atomic tests had been held at Bikini in 1946,26 s and reports of the test
results filled the world's newspapers throughout the period when the Trustee-
ship Agreement passed through the stages of preliminary discussion, draft-
ing, and presentation of the Agreement to the Security Council. In this con-
text, the debate on the Agreement in the Security Council confirmed by ex-
plicit multiple references that the United States was to be accorded virtually
unrestricted powers in matters relating to security, whether its own or that of
the world. -2 69 The United States made its position clear by refusing even to
consider any amendments which could be interpreted as detracting from its
powers or limiting its complete discretion as Administering Authority in
security matters. At one point in the debate United States Representative
Warren R. Austin asserted that, while the United States would not exercise
its veto power, if amendments unacceptable to the United States were adopted
the agreement would be withdrawn, with American administration of the
territory continuing in any event.270
The Trusteeship Agreement was drafted by the United States State De-
263. Id., art. 73.
264. GooDaIcH & HAx-mo, CHARmR OF THE U.Ena NA&TioNs 453 (1949).
265. TRusrTEsHiP AGEmr-,,r art. 6, 1 Z
266. Id., art. 6, ff 3.
267. Id., art. 6, i 1, 4, art. 7.
263. N.Y. Times, July 1, 1946, p. 1, col. 8; id., July 25, 1946, p. 1, cul. 8.
269. See, particularly, U.N. SEcuRrry Couxcu. OFF. REc., 2d year, 124th meeting
664-65 (1947) ; id., 123d meeting 627, 628, 636, 637-38; id., 119th meeting 528, 530-31 ; id.,
113th meeting 412.
270. Id., 124th meeting 670. See also SCHUMAN, INTEFNATIONAL POLITICS 599 (4th
ed. 1948); U.S.-U.N. ITFomATIO, SuR., No. 21, at 6 (U.S. Dep't State 1947).
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partment after consultation with the War and Navy Departments, 211 and in
the view of its draftsman did not impinge upon United States "autonomy with
respect to national security . . . in the slightest degree." 272  As originally
drafted, Article 3 of the Agreement gave to the administering authority full
powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory "as an
integral part of the United States. '273 An amendment to delete the latter
phrase was introduced by the Soviet Union, apparently to negate any infer-
ence that the Territory was ultimately to be annexed to the United States.
27 4
The United States accepted the amendment, but was careful to make clear
that it was not to be considered as having diminished its powers in the Terri-
tory by doing so:
"I want to say the following, because I think these words should be in-
cluded in the record of this solemn proceeding .... In agreeing to this
modification, my Government feels that for record purposes it should
affirm that its authority in the trust territory is not to be considered as
in any way lessened thereby . . . . For administrative, legislative and
jurisdictional convenience in carrying out its duty towards the peoples of
the trust territory, the United States intends to treat the trust territory
as if it were an integral part of the United States.
'2 7
5
After unanimous approval of the agreement by the Security Council,2 °0
public hearings were held by the United States Congress to consider a joint
resolution authorizing the President to approve it. Every witness was asked
whether the agreement restrained the freedom of action of the United States
in any way in the use of the Pacific islands for security purposes. Each wit-
ness replied in the most emphatic terms that the agreement gave the United
States a completely free hand. The following colloquy is typical:
The CHAIRMAN (Senator Vandenburg). Mr. Secretary, . . . I would
like to have your opinion as to whether there is anything in your opinion
which in any degree handicaps or restrains our freedom of action in the
use of these islands for security purposes.
Secretary MARSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I think the terms of the agree-
ment have been so carefully drafted from the security point of view that
there is no doubt in my mind that our security and our responsibility
271. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreiqn Relations on S.J. Res. 143,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1947).
272. Colloquy between Senator Vandenburg and Benjamin Gerig, Chief, Division of
Dependent Area Affairs, Department of State. Id. at 21.
273. Draft Trusteeship Agreement for the Japanese Mandated Islands, FAR EAs'rhN
SER., No. 20, at 4 (U.S. Dep't State 1947).
274. U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC., 2d year, 113th meeting 415 (1947), The
purpose of the amendment is inferred from the general tenor of the several amendments
offered by the Soviet Union, ibid., its acquiescence in the United States' qualified accep-
tance of the principal amendment, see text at note 275 infra, and from the understanding
of the purpose of the amendment revealed by other nations' representatives in debate. See,
e.g., U.N. SECuRITY COUNCIL OFF. REc., 2d year, 122d meeting 630-31 (1947).
275. Id., 116th meeting 473.
276. Id., 124th meeting 473.
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for general security are fully provided for. I refer the members of the
committee to articles 3, 5, and 13 of the agreement. I believe all our in-
terests are fully conserved.
The CHAIRMAX. So far as the use of these islands for security pur-
poses is concerned, in what degree do we have less authority than we
would have if we continued to run them the way they are being run now.,
Secretary MARSIHALL. I think under the terms of this trusteeship agree-
ment we are not limited at all ....
The CHAIR.MA-. So that you would say, as I understand you, that
under the terms of the trusteeship agreement we have the same freedom
of action on behalf of national security as we would have if we were
continuing the administration of the islands under our present exclusive
control?
Secretary 'MARSHALL. I think that is correct, sir.
2"17
The purpose of the United States to secure virtually unlimited powers with
respect to security matters in the trust territory was made clear not only to
the United States Congress and the Security Council but to the whole world.
Almost every commentator who has had occasion to discuss the agreement has
remarked upon the broad scope of the security powers it confers,27 8 and those
who favor strong international control over trust territories have bitterly at-
tacked it as "an instrument of annexation, tempered with expressions of
benevolence." 279 The publicist Walter Lippman advocated annexation, calling
it "hypocritical" to place the islands under trusteeship by an agreement per-
mitting us "to do anything and everything we would do if we had annexed
them."
280
The view that the Agreement gave to the United States virtually unlimited
security powers is confirmed by the subsequent conduct of both parties to the
agreement. In December 1947, it was announced that experiments relating
to nuclear fission would be held at Eniwetok,2 8 and the United States advised
277. Hearings, supra note 271, at 5. For comparable statements by Secretary of War
Patterson, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, General Eisenhower, and Admiral Nimitz, see
id. at 11-2, 14-15, 18-19, 19-20. Secretary Patterson said, "The obligations we take under
the agreement are merely obligations that we would fulfill to any people under our flag,
even apart from the engagements and covenants in this agreement, as I see it-such things
as their political ... , economic .... social.. . , and educational development, and the
basic freedoms that we would accord any people that were living under the United States
flag." Id. at 12.
278. See, e.g., BENTwICH & MARTIN, CHART R OF THE UNITED NATIo::s 155-56 (1950);
GooDicH & HAimo, CHARTM OF THE UNrrED NATions 453-54 (1949) ; ScnUMAN., op.
cit. snpra note 270, at 599; Gross, United Nations Trusteeship and League of Nations
Mandate Systems, 4 INDiA QuARTRLY 224 (1948).
279. SCHIJMAX, op. cit. supra note 270, at 599.
280. N.Y. Herald Tribune, Feb. 2, 1946, p. 13, col. 2. For an attack on Mr. Lippmann's
views, see 63 CHRISTLA.N CENTURY 231 (1946). See also McKay, Internatlional Trustee-
ship-Role of United Nations in the Colonial W~orld, 22 FOREIGN POLic" REo.nrs 54
(1946).
281. N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1947, p. 1, col. 6.
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the Security Council that the area was "closed" for this specific purpose. 282
Continuous reports of testing activities emanated from Eniwetok from 1947
onward, and tests relating to thermonuclear development were conducted in
1951 and 1952.283 In April 1953, the Security Council was notified that the
United States had extended the "closed area" to include Bikini, again for the
specific purpose of conducting tests "relating to nuclear fission." 284 Although
this course of action had in the beginning been the subject of official corres-
pondence and perfunctory comment in the Security Council,21 and was a
matter of continuing public knowledge, no nation, not even the Soviet Union,
expressed any surprise or made any protest whatever.
It would scarcely seem necessary to recall, if various commentators had
not focused upon the limitations in the Charter and the Trusteeship Agree-
ment without adequate consideration of the powers granted,280 that the most
fundamental principle of treaty interpretation, especially applicable to great
constitutional charters, is "that the Treaty must be read as a whole, and that
its meaning is not to be determined merely upon particular phrases which, if
detached from the context, may be interpreted in more than one sense."28 17
As Judge Hudson has emphasized, when a treaty sets up a r~ghne, each of
its provisions must be construed "by reference to its place in a system."2 8
Powers can be given rational interpretation only in the context of the limita-
tions imposed upon them: and conversely, limitations upon power can be
given meaning only by reference to the powers which they are intended to
limit. Hardly less fundamental than this principle that international agree-
ments must be interpreted as a whole, with due regard being given to all
parts, is the principle of "effectiveness"-tbe principle that agreements must
be interpreted in context and primarily in terms of the major general put'-
poses, the basic goals and expectations, which they are intended to serve.
28 0t
282. Letter from Warren R. Austin, Representative of the United States of America,
concerning the conducting of experiments relating to nuclear fission on Eniwetok Atoll
in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, U.N. Doc. No. S/613 (1947).
283. N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1952, p. 1, col. 8; id., May 26, 1951, p. 1, col. 4.
284. U.N. Doc. No. S/2978 (1953).
285. 5 U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC., 2d year, 222d meeting 2771-72 (1947).
286. See the argument of the Indian and Soviet representatives on the Standing Coin-
mittee on Petitions of the U.N. Trusteeship Council, Summary Record, 9-13 (U.N. Doe.
No. T/C.2/SR.197) (1954), and Margolis, pp. 643-45.
287. Competence of the International Labour Organisation, P.C.I.J., Ser. B, Nos. 2 &
3, p. 23 (1922). See also Diversion of Water from the River Meuse, P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B,
No. 70, pp. 21, 23 (1937) ; Statute of Memel Case, P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 49, pp. 312, 317,
321 (1932) ; Polish Postal Service in Danzig, P.C.I.J., Ser. B, No. 11, pp. 39-40 (1925) :
Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 37 (1931) ; Hamilton v. Erie R.R., 219 N.Y. 343,
353, 114 N.E. 399, 403 (1916); 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTRNATIONAL LAW 249-50
(1943).
288. HUDSON, THE PER.IANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 1920-1942, at 6,18
(1943).
289. Highest recent authority for the paramount importance of this principle is found
in the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Reparation for Injurics
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Thus the Harvard Research insists that the meaning to be given to an agree-
ment is "not just any meaning which appeals to the interpreter ... but a
meaning which, in the light of the test under consideration and of all the con-
comitant circumstances of the particular case at hand, appears in his con-
sidered judgment to be one that is logical, reasonable, and most likely to
accord with and to effectuate the larger general purpose which the parties
desired the treaty to serve. '200 In the black letter of its proposed Draft Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties, the Research is concise and definitive:
"A treaty is to be interpreted in the light of the general purpose which
it is intended to serve. The historical background of the treaty, travaux
pr~paratoires, the circumstances of the parties at the time the treaty was
entered into, the change in these circumstances sought to be effected, the
subsequent conduct of the parties in applying the provisions of the treaty,
and the conditions prevailing at the time interpretation is being made,
are to be considered in connection with the general purpose which the
treaty is intended to serve.
' 2 91
From the perspective of the major purposes of the parties to the United
Nations Charter and to the Trusteeship Agreement, recounted in detail above,
it almost belies credulity that a critic could suggest that the conclusion is "in-
escapable" that the hydrogen bomb tests are "clearly at variance" with sup-
posed "unqualified imperatives" of the Charter and the Trusteeship Agree-
ment. 92 Such a suggestion ignores the broad grants of power to the Ad-
ministering Authority contained in both documents, and attempts to construe
the limitations upon those powers as autonomous, disembodied absolutes. 
3
Suffered in the Service of the United Nations. Advisory Opinion of April 11, 1949, [19491
I.C.J. Rep. 174, 179, 182; accord, International Status of Southwest Africa, Advisory
Opinion of July 11, 1950, [1950] IC.J. Rep. 128, 133. See also HARVARD Rrr_,%cn Dns-r
oN T .mA=s 948-53 (1935); 2 HYDE, INTEINATIOMAL LAW 1468 et seq. (2d ed. 1945);
LAUTERPACHT, DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 69-70 (1934); \VEsmTL~ , INT R-
NATIONAL LAw 293 (2d ed. 1910) ; Yu, INTERPRETATION, OF Tr.ArTIES passim (192-7) ; Fair-
man, The Interpretation of Treaties, 20 Tax.xs. GRornus Sc%!v 123 (1935); McDougal &
Gardner, The Veto and the Charter: an Interpretation for Sunrvial, 60 YALE LEJ. 258, 26,6-
69 (1951); Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretation and the Prhnciple of Effeeth'e:ess in
the Interpretation of Treaties, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 48 (1949); Pollux, The Interpreta-
tion of the Charter, 23 id. 54 (1946).
290. HIARvAn RESEARcH, op. cit. snupra note 289, at 946.
291. Id., art. 19.
292. See largolis, pp. 644,645.
It may be observed further that Dr. Margolis' "dilemma" vith respect to the "duties
imposed by the U.N. Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement" that "te greater the pre-
cautions taken by the administering authority to protect the health of the Marshallse
people, the greater the infringement of the rights guaranteed them" is, in his ,wn words,
"not unlike that created by the doctrine of freedom of navigation": it begs the very ques-
tion in issue, whether the United States' activities are "infringements" of "rights" guaran-
teed, or "exercises" of "powers" granted, by the Charter and Trusteeship Agreement.
293. Few people today take seriously attempts so to construe national constitutions.
It is commonly recognized that grants of power and limitations upon power are as in-
divisible as scissors' blades, and must be construed simultaneously in determining the rea-
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The tests conducted by the United States in the islands may be sub-
sumed most easily, in giving effect to the major purposes and expectations of
the parties, under the broad powers conferred upon the United States to pro-
mote and protect both international peace and security and its own individual
security. The Trusteeship Agreement specifically authorizes the use of
"facilities and assistance" for the protection of international peace and securi-
ty,294 and the broad powers reserved by the United States with a view to
serving its own peculiar security needs have already been recounted. 205 The
reality of the role of the United States in promoting international peace and
security is apparent from its enormous contribution in manpower and ma-
terial to the collective United Nations action to repel aggression in Korea,
and its continuing efforts to act through the United Nations to achieve dis-
armament, including prohibition of nuclear weapons, and the peaceful settle-
ment of disputes. In an interdependent world, being made ever more inter-
dependent by a continuously developing technology, even a disinterested ob-
server should be able to discern some relation between the security of other
nation-states and that of the United States.290 Proponents of a free world
society and of a world order honoring human dignity should, in particular,
sonableness and, hence, lawfulness of governmental activity. Examples could be offered
from the whole structure of constitutional prescription. A particularly striking example
may be noted with respect to the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Although the amendment provides that Congress "shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech . . . ," the Government may limit absolute freedom under many different
powers. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) ; American Communications
Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). See also E.r partc Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2,
124-27 (1866); United States v. Russell. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623 (1872); Duncan v.
Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 324, 335 (1945) (concurring opinions of Chief Justice Stone
and Justice Murphy).
294. TRUSTEESHIP AGREEaMENT art. 5.
At least five modes of pursuing "international peace and security" have been estab-
lished under the Charter. Thus, action may be taken by the Security Council, by the
"regional" organizations contemplated in U.N. CHARTER c. 8, by the General Assembly
under the "Uniting for Peace" resolutions, by individual nation-states under the "self-
defense" clause of U.N. CHARTER art. 51, and by organizations such as NATO, SEATO,
the Brussels Treaty, the Arab League, and the Balkan Union, which are "collective self-
defense" organizations under the same Article. See generally BECKETr, THE NORTH AT-
LANTIC TREATY, THE BRUSSELS TREATY AND THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1950) ;
Bebr, Regional Organications-A United Nations Problem, 49 Ai. J. INT'L L. No. 2
(1955) ; Kelsen, Tile North Atlantic Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations, 9
AcrA SCANDINAVICA IURis GENTIUm 42 (1949); McDougal & Gardner, The Veto and
the Charter: An Imterpretation for Survival, 60 YALE L.J. 258, 288-92 (1951). Fortunately,
only direct action by the Security Council, and possibly action by regional organizations
based on Chapter VIII, are subject to prior control by the veto-bound Security Council.
Effective use of the Uniting for Peace Resolutions and Article 51 regional organizations
depends, of course, on the efforts of individual states to maintain forces and weapons in
readiness in case of need.
295. See text at notes 253-61 supra.
296. For some of the interrelations of international and national security, see Wolfers.
"National Security" as an Ambiguous Symbol, 47 POL. Sci. Q. 481 (1952).
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have no difficulty in finding a most intimate relationship. Even, however, if
it be assumed, that there is no relationship between "international security"
and the security of the United States, it is clear that the United States has
reserved in the Trusteeship Agreement, in accord with the terms of the
Charter, more than sufficient powers to conduct the tests in the interests of
its own security.
It has been seen that the comprehensive powers accorded to the United States
includes substantially all the powers it would have within its own boundaries,
subject only to the exception that its "war" power does not authorize conscrip-
tion.2 9 7 The right of eminent domain is implicit in the "full powers of ad-
ministration, legislation and jurisdiction"298 and the power "to establish naval,
military and air bases and to erect fortifications."20 It is therefore clear that
the United States is empowered to use sonic land, and some facilities and
assistance from the territory, and therefore that the duties of the Administer-
ing Authority with respect to the protection of land, encouragement of
fisheries, and so on, are not "unqualified imperatives."3 00 By the most funda-
mental criteria of treaty interpretation, indicated above, it would also appear
that the United States is authorized to use some land and facilities for the
purpose of testing dangerous weapons: the testing of weapons is indispens-
able to preparation for defense under war and security powers; the fact that
the United States had already tested weapons in the area made continued
testing a part of the expectations of all the framers of the Trusteeship Agree-
ment ;301 and these expectations have been confirmed by seven years' conduct,
sans protest, by both parties to the Agreement.30 2 The one remaining ques-
tion is whether the tests conducted, though clearly subsumable under the
powers granted to the United States, have assumed such unreasonable pro-
portions as to violate the duties said to constitute limitations upon its
powers.
3 03
Since the Pacific Islands became a Trust Territory, the United States has
taken Eniwetok Atoll (2.26 square miles of land) for use in connection with
its weapons testing activities. 30 4 The 137 inhabitants of the atoll were re-
settled on land of their own choosing from the public domain, where build-
ings and facilities have been constructed for their use by the Administering
Authority, and they have since been regarded as special wards of the govern-
ment.305
297. See text at notes 255-60 supra.
298. TRUSTEESHIP AGREEMENT art. 3.
299. Id., art. 5.
300. Margolis, p. 644.
30!L See text at notes 268-70 supra.
302. See text at notes 281-85 supra.
303. For illustrations of the necessity of a "reasonableness" test in the resolution of
any constitutional issue requiring determination of the interrelationships of powers and
limitations, see note 293 supra.
304. For the land area of Eniwetok, see N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1947, p. 24, col. 5.
305. N.Y. Times, Dec. 75, 1947, p. 14, col. 3; id., Dec. 2, 1947, p. 24, col. 3.
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In the process of conducting the first test in history of a "high-yield"
thermonuclear weapon, the force of the explosion was underestimated by half,
and wind predictions, ordinarily highly accurate at sea, were erroneous8 00
Minor injuries were suffered, in consequence, by the inhabitants of Rongelap
Atoll, from which they have since recovered with no prospect of permanent
after-effects.307 The United States has given assurances that all meritorious
damage claims will be honored promptly.308 Neither fishing nor any other
activities of the islanders were curtailed by the tests except in the case of the
236 persons evacuated temporarily from Rongelap and Utirik after the test
of March 1st.3 0 9 United States Representative Sears informed the Trustee-
ship Council, on the basis of "security information," that there is "no chance
of a recurrence" of the mishap that occurred in March 1954.810
For appraising reasonableness, it is material to note that if the United
States had totally evacuated, in advance, every inhabited island affected by
306. N.Y. Times, April 1, 1954, p. 20, cols. 1-3.
307. See note 26 supra.
308. See note 7 supra.
309. Communication from Deputy High Commissioner, Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands, to the Yale Law Journal, Feb. 24, 1955, on file in Yale Law Library.
The assertion in Margolis, p. 645, that the Marshallese were deprived of fishing
grounds for "months at a time," is true only of the 72 inhabitants of Rongelap, who were
unable to fish for three months, after which they were resettled on Majuro Atoll.
Communication from Deputy High Commissioner, supra. See also note 26 sn pra.
Dr. Margolis' assertion that the tests have retarded "the development of fisheries"
is misleading, since the Marshallese to date have engaged only in subsistence
fishing, and the Administering Authority's efforts to develop commercial fisheries
have not been successful. See the report of the visiting U.N. Mission to the Pacific Islands,
U.N. TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL OFF. REC., 12th Sess., Supp. No. 3, pp. 16-17 (Doe. No.
T/1077) (1953), listing the virtually insuperable obstacles to development of a commer-
cial fishing industry manned by the islanders. A principal difficulty, in the Visiting
Mission's view, was that "the islanders are adjusted t6 a subsistence economy and lack
the heritage and incentives to indulge in what is probably one of the most rigorous pur-
suits." Id. at 17.
310. U.N. TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL OFF. REC., 14th Sess., 561st meeting 245 (1954).
The assertions made by Margolis, pp. 639, 645 n.86, that the destructive power of nuclear
weapons is "incalculable," and the injury to persons and property necessarily accompanies
nuclear tests, are simply incorrect, if highest authority is to be believed. Sir Winston
Churchill told the House of Commons, in April 1954, that "after full consultation with our
technical experts," he could repeat the assurance previously given that there was "no foun-
dation" for the suggestion that the explosions were "incalculable." N.Y. Times, April 6,
1954, p. 12, col. 3. See also Teller, The Work of Maily People, 121 SciErNcE 267, 270
(1955) ; Statement by Admiral Strauss in N.Y. Times, April 1, 1954, p. 20, col. 1. The
Report of the AEC of February 15, 1955, makes clear that, in view of the vast distances
separating inhabited islands in the Pacific, tests can be conducted with no danger of injury
to anyone not participating in testing activities if certain simple precautions are taken. See
note 35 supra. Had the fallout danger been known prior to the 1954 tests, most if not all
injuries could have been avoided by the most elementary precautions. See Standing Coln-
mittee on Petitions, U.N. Trusteeship Council, Summary Record 5 (Doc. No. T/C.2/SR.
197) (1954).
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the March 1st explosion and its fallout, 236 people and a total land area of
4.01 square miles would have been affected. 311 In order to put these figures
in perspective, it might be noted that if the United States had constructed a
large airfield on one of the more heavily populated islands, its action would
have affected more people and more land for a longer time, although such
action would be within the terms of the Charter and the Agreement under
any conceivable interpretation. It seems clear that unless an imaginative view
of the facts is taken, the United States has not taken, and is never likely to need,
an amount of land in the territory for weapons testing purposes which could
be considered disproportionate or unreasonable.
The duties to promote the welfare of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory
assumed by the United States in the Charter and Trusteeship Agreement, in-
cluding the duty to protect the inhabitants' land and resources, appear to have
been performed in an exemplary manner. The specific target of the provision
in the agreement relating to land was the colonial practice, widespread before
the war, of economic exploitation of the natives' land for the benefit of out-
siders, relegating the indigenous population to the status of laborers or ten-
ants.3 2 In 1939, the population of the islands was 113,562 of which 73,028
were Japanese, and well over half the land in the islands was owned by the
latter.313 By 1948 all the former Japanese residents had been repatriated to
Japan, and the Administration had forbidden and still forbids acquisition of
title to land in the territory by non-indigenous persons.314 Moreover, all land
taken for public purposes has been replaced from the public domain.310 The
extent to which the United States has carried out its duty to protect the health
of the inhabitants may be seen in the fact that the indigenous population in-
creased by nearly one-fourth in the first five years of United States adminis-
tration, although it had decreased by one-fourth from 1935 to 1939,310 and in
1946 was reported "well on the way to extinction through disease."3 17 Com-
parable progress in trade, conservation, agriculture, industry, transport and
311. See note 35 supra.
312. This legislative intention is inferred from the context in which the provision
appears, and from the legislative history of Article 76 of the Charter. See Do. No. 1090,
11/4/43, 10 U.N. CONF. INT'L ORG. Docs. 563-64 (1945); cf. UNmT NATions, SPECLAL
STUDY ONT ECONOMIIC CONDITIONS AND DEvEWPMFN'rs 270-71 (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 1952,
VI.B.2) (listing the principal land problems in non-self-governing territories).
313. ENcYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA VoRLD ATAs 225 (1942); U.S. NAvy DEP' TRusT
TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS 30-32 (1948).
314. Id. at 109-11; U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, 1952 REPORT ON THE ADmIsTRATION OF
THE TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS 35 (1953).
315. Ibid.
316. ENCYCLOPAF~iA BRITANNICA WORLD ATAs 225 (1942); and conpare U.S. NavY
DEP'T, op. cit. supra note 313, at 76, with U.S. DEP'T OF INTERI0% op. cit. supra note 314,
at 67.
317. Statement by Rear Admiral C.A. Pownall, first post-war High Commissioner,
in N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1946, p. 10, col. 5.
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communications, human rights, education, and standard of living is recounted
in the Administering Authority's annual reports to the Trusteeship Council.9 18
The United States has repeatedly expressed its extreme regret that ill
effects were suffered by the inhabitants of Rongelap as a consequence of its
tests, and has promised both that it would give prompt and sympathetic at-
tention to any claims for damage suffered in the past, and that nothing would
be left undone to safeguard the present and future well-being of the inhabi-
tants.319 The Marshallese, acting through the authors of their petition to the
Trusteeship Council, have expressed appreciation for the spirit in which the
United States Government received their petition, and stressed that the
petition should not be interpreted as a sign of lack of confidence in the United
States as Administering Authority.320 On July 15, 1954, the United Nations
Trusteeship Council, before which the conduct of the United States had been
drawn in question, accepted by nine votes to three a resolution vindicating
the United States and recommending that:
"if the Administering Authority considers it necessary in the interests of
world peace and security to conduct further nuclear experiments in the
Territory, it take such precautions as will ensure that no inhabitants of
the Territory are again endangered, including those precautionary mea-
sures requested by the petitioners.
'3 2' 1
318. Reports for 1947-1950 were published by the Navy Department; later reports by
the Department of the Interior. See also the favorable report of the U.N. Trusteeship
Council Visiting Mission, supra note 309, passti.
319. See notes 6, 8 supra.
320. U.N. TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL OFF. REc., 14th Sess., 561st meeting 247 (1954).
321. U.N. Dbc. No. T/L.504, p. 2 (1954).
In view of the conclusion reached as to the legality of U.S. thermonuclear weapons tests
in the Marshalls, brief mention of the proposals that the tests be conducted elsewhere should
suffice.
Various commentators have urged that all tests be conducted henceforth within the
United States. See, e.g., Margolis, pp.646-47; Arnold, Effects of the Rcceit Bomb Tests o)
Human Beings, 10 BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS 347, 348 (1954). The warning zone found
necessary for conducting the 1954 Castle Series of tests in the Pacific was 400,000 square
miles, equal to about one-seventh of the land area of the United States. While the danger
of spreading radioactivity by ocean currents would be small or non-existent, so that a
smaller danger area would no doubt suffice for tests conducted within the United States,
evacuation of an area even remotely comparable to the Pacific zone would displace many
thousands, and conceivably millions of people, and would radioactivate at least temporarily a
vast area of useful land. Cf. Arnold, supra, at 348, making the incredible assertion that con-
ducting tests in the U.S. would save money ! It is reasonably obvious that the possible conse-
quences of tests in the U.S. cannot seriously be compared with test consequences in the
Marshalls. See note 35 supra. The area covered by the Trust Territory and that of the United
States are both approximately 3,000,000 square miles, but the Territory comprises only 846
square miles of land, of which islands totalling 166 square miles are uninhabited. See text
at note 13 supra; U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, 1951 REPORT ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF TIE
TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS 68 (1953). The total population of the entire
Territory is 57,037, ibid., approximately one-fourth that of Honolulu.
The authors do not profess to be qualified to say whether tests would be technically
feasible in Alaska or the Arctic. However, these proposals by Margolis, pp. 646-47, raise
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The prospect of the possible use of the hydrogen bomb against human
beings is almost too horrible to contemplate. It appears probable that each
half of the world will shortly have the capacity quickly to destroy the other:
the common analogy of two death-dealing scorpions enclosed in a small bottle
has become all too apt. Under these circumstances the need for the peoples
of the world to agree upon and enforce workable plans for disarmament and
world public order could not be more urgent. We bow to none in recognition
of this need and in demand for rational response. We do not, however, re-
gard it as rational response for the free world unilaterally to disarm itself by
the unnecessary extrapolation of broad prescriptions from the customary in-
ternational law of the sea, created for other purposes, or by the narrow and
technical interpretation apart from context of selected phrases from great in-
ternational charters.32 2 Until a reasonably secure world public order can be
established, the free half of the world has no alternative but to make certain
that it remains a scorpion and does not invite transformation into inanimate
radioactive dust. It is only by maintaining their capacity to defend their free
institutions that proponents of human dignity can hope to achieve by peace-
interesting questions with respect to his arguments derived from the U.N. Charter and the
"freedom of the seas" principle. Alaska is a "Non-Self-Governing Territory" to which
Article 73 applies, YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1948-1949, at 729-30 (U.N. Pub. Sales
No. 1950, 1.11), and the regime of the high seas applies at the least to unfrozen areas of the
Arctic. Franklin & McClintock, The Territorial Claims of Nations it; the Arctic, 5 OnM.
L. Ray. 37, 43-44 (1952). It thus appears to be Margolis' position that tests in these
areas would be more reasonable than tests elsewhere.
The facts suggest a different answer. Even if tests in Alaska and the Arctic are tech-
nically feasible, these areas are subjected to e-tremely erratic high winds, see, generally,
CANADA DEP'T OF TRANSPORT, METEOROLOGY OF THE CANADIAN A ncc 12-15, 53-55 (1944),
which could create intolerable danger for those conducting the tests, and might spread the
effects of the fallout over vast distances. Moreover, accessible parts of both Alaska and
the Arctic are closer to better fisheries, more heavily traveled navigational routes, and
more heavily populated areas. Indeed, Alaska is closer to the mainland of Japan than is
Bikini. Margolis is, finally, in error in asserting that the United States has laid claim to
an arctic "sector." The United States is most persistent among the many states which
unqualifiedly reject the validity of the "sector" theory. See U.S. NAvAL WNAR Coy Fz,
INTERNATIONAL LAW Docuuraxrs 1948-1949, at 243-44 (1950).
In sum, there seems no reason to doubt the assertion of the United States that the
Marshall Islands "were selected only because there is no other place in the world over
which the United States has jurisdiction where... [these] experiments could be success-
fully conducted with less danger." 'Mason E. Sears, U.S. Mission to the United Nations
Press Release No. 1937, July 13, 1954.
322. World order does indeed depend upon "law," see Margolis, p. 646, but law has
little relation to the suicidal invocation and extrapolation of irrelevant, absolutistic labels.
The proponents of human dignity face enough difficulties in their struggle for survival
without inflicting unnecessary psychological wounds upon themselves. The prestige of the
United States that matters depends, as does that of other bodies politic, not upon sub-
servience to such labels, but rather upon the intensity of its dedication to the goal values
of human dignity and its clarifying and adhering to an international lav which rationally
promotes such goal values.
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ful procedures a world public order which can continue to maintain that de-
fense. Without at least a portion of the world defended in its freedom it
would be folly to talk of freedom of the seas and the welfare of dependent
peoples, both impossible to isolate from the freedom and welfare of a whole
interdependent free world. The only rational policy for proponents of human
dignity today is to demand, and to demand from a strength which insures
respect, not merely spurious or naive legalisms and not merely freedom for
navigation and fishing and the narrowly conceived and unrealistically isolated
welfare of a few scattered peoples, but workable prescriptions and institutions
for global disarmament and a world public order which will afford opportunity
for the increasing freedom and welfare of all peoples in the full exploitation
of all the world's riches.
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